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COMMENTS AND NOTES
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT:
AN ATTEMPT TO INTERPRET TITLE VII
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Four years have elapsed since the enactment of federal fair employ-
ment practice legislation banning sex discrimination which is not
justified by a "bona fide occupational qualification." In delineat-
ing those employment practices which violate the sex discrimination
proscription, however, lower federal courts and the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission have frequently reached con-
flicting conclusions. This comment compares those conclusions with
the Act's legislative history and attempts to construct an analytical
framework within which the meaning of the sex discrimination ban
may be determined.
N PROMULGATING Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress
squarely challenged the traditional assumption that sex constitutes a
proper basis for employment differentials.1 That Act declares it an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer, employment agency, or labor
organization to deny an individual equal employment opportunity be-
cause of that individual's sex, unless the resulting discrimination is justi-
fied by a "bona fide occupational qualification." Complementing federal2
and state3 equal-pay-for-equal-work laws and state fair employment
practice (FEP) legislation,4 Title VIl's policy against sex discrimination,
in addition to being carried out under the Act's own provisions, is also
being implemented at present by executive and administrative regulation in
areas such as government contracts and labor-management relations.5
Although the impact of the Title VII ban thus promises to be widespread,
its exact dimensions and content are not yet clear. Therefore, this com-
42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
EqualPay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
'This legislation is discussed in a historical context at notes 14-24 infra and
accompanying text.
' Prior to Title VI's enactment only two state FEP laws, Hawaii's and Wiscon-
sin's, prohibited sex discrimination. Present state PEP laws which ban sex discrimi-
nation are discussed with respect to their enforcement procedures at notes 64-66 inIra
and accompanying text.
'Title VII enforcement, executive regulation and the possibility of sex discrimi-
nation sanctions under the federal labor legislation are discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 52-89 infra.
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ment will attempt to ascertain the extent to which employment practices
may legitimately continue to be based upon sex considerations.
TITLE VI'S HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Sex discrimination in employment6 has traditionally restricted the
American woman's occupational alternatives7 and deprived her of equal
compensation for her work.8 The eradication of such discrimination, how-
ever, has not been the consistent goal of those attempting to improve the
conditions of female work. Rather, improvement efforts have run in two
divergent and basically antagonistic currents. 9 One effort, politically
viable since the mid-nineteenth century, has been to secure legislation
protecting the female worker from exploitation.' 0 Countering this pa-
ternalistic approach is the twentieth century philosophy stressing the
equality of the sexes - a creed which rejects the necessity of protection. 1"
I For a discussion of the broader range of sex discrimination see Kanowitz,
Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law: 1. Law and the Single Girl, 11 ST. Louis
U.LJ. 293 (1967).
7Because of the arduous tasks assigned to women, sexual segregation of occu-
pations has sometimes been difficult to explain. See R. SMUTS, WOMEN AND WORK
IN AMERICA 18-19, 88 (1959). Although such sexual segregation has been slightly
reduced during this century, primarily because men have moved into formerly "fe-
male jobs," the segregation is still much more severe than racial segregation. See E.
Gross, Plus Ca Change.. . The Sexual Structure of Occupations Over Time 6, 10,
August 30, 1967 (revision of paper read at 62nd annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association, Department of Sociology, University of Washington).
8 Differentials in pay between men and women performing the same work have
frequently been justified on the grounds that women are more expensive to employ
and less useful as employees. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 3861 and Related Bills
Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 95-108, 184-86, 241-47 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
HR. 3861] (greater turnover and absenteeism rate; higher cost of providing special
facilities required by law). The vast pay differentials which do exist, see Hearings
on H.R. 3861, 13-57, may not be statistically justified, however. See WOMEN'S BU-
REAu, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WHAT ABOUT WOMEN'S ABSENTEEISM AND LABOR TURN-
oveR? (rev. August 1965). One historian has observed that the typical female
worker of 1890 was single, interested in a short career only, and not dependent upon
her wages for the necessities of life. R. SMUTS, supra note 7, at 23-24, 38-51. See
also E. BAKER, TECHNOLOGY AND WOMAN'S WORK 80-83 (1964). The advent of
equal pay legislation at least in part reflects the changing pattern of the female
labor force.
I These currents are observed in R. SMuTrs, supra note 7, at 106-09.
"oSee E. BAKER, supra note 8, at 88-96; WOMEN'S BUREAu, U.S; DEP'T OF LA-
BOR, BULL. No. 66, HISTORY OF LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN IN THREE STATES
(1929). The protective legislation is discussed at notes 165-200 infra and accom-
panying text.
I" See R. Sanrs, supra note 7, at 107-09, 126-45.
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Superficially, Title VII seems to mark both the ascendance of the latter
feminist movement and the decline of the "sweat shop" conditions which
had motivated much of the earlier paternalism.12 However, to the extent
that Title VII is interpreted to require business to absorb the cost of
discovering unusually able women or the cost of disregarding cultural
prejudices, the Act may actually reflect the earlier viewpoint that women
workers are properly the object of protective welfare legislation. Thus,
the Act may encompass the goals of both currents of thought.
Title VII is not the first legislative product to bear the imprint of the
feminists' demand for employment equality. The State of Washington
enacted a law in 1890 declaring that no person was to be disqualified
from any business, calling or employment on account of sex. 13 More
representative of efforts toward employment equality were the equal pay
laws which first began to appear in the aftermath of World War I. Pro-
hibiting wage differentials between the sexes where equal work was being
performed, such legislation was enacted as early as 1919 by Michigan,14
Montana 15 and Texas.16 Benevolence was not the only motivation for
the equal pay laws; the influx of women into industry during the war years
compelled organized labor to support such laws, in order to avoid com-
petition from cheap female labor which would otherwise be available.17
Labor's same self-interest largely explains the passage of equal pay laws
in other states during World War ]].18 However, some of these early
statutory enactments were rather ineffective. All but two of the early laws
"But cf. Rossi, Equality Between the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal, 93
DAEDALUS 607, 608 (1964): "'There is praztically no feminist spark left among
American women.... Young women seem increasingly uncommitted to anything
beyond early marriage, motherhood and a suburban house."
13 WAsH. REv. CoDE § 49.12.200 (Supp. 1965).
"Law of May 12, 1919, no. 239 [19193 Mich. Acts 427, now MicH. CoMP.
LAWS § 750.556 (1968).
'I Law of March 7, 1919, ch. 147 [1919] Mont. Laws 288, now MoNT. REv.
CODES ANN. §§ 41-1307, -1308 (1961).
"Law of March 20, 1919, ch. 89 [1919] Tex. Gen. Laws 145, as amended,
TEx. R a. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6825 (1960) (the original law applied to state em-
ployees and public school teachers, but the present law applies only to state em-
ployees).
" See E. BAKER, supra note 8, at 412-13.
8 Law of March 22, 1943, ch. 254 [1943] Wash. Laws 786, now WASH. Rv.
CODE § 49.12.175 (1963); Law of July 22, 1943 [1943] M1l. Laws 743, now ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 48, §§ 4(a)-(b) (1965); Law of April 14, ch. 793 [1944] N.Y. Laws 1755,
as amended, N.Y. LAaOR LAw §§ 194-199 (McKinney Supp. 1967). The support of
organized labor is discussed in 46 COLUM. L. Rv. 442, 442 & n.4 (1946).
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provided only penal sanctions,19 and the burden of proving criminal guilt
rendered their enforcement quite difficult.20 The Washington law, which
provided for civil recovery, meant little to the employee whose damages
would not offset the high cost of bringing the action.21 However, as state
legislative activity continued, improvements were made in the enforce-
ment provisions.22 For instance, the Massachusetts Act,23 which was
based in part upon the New York Act and which still serves as a model
19E.g., MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 41-1307, -1308 (1961) ($25 - $500 fine).
But see WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.175 (1963) (civil recovery only); ch. 793 [1944]
N.Y. Laws 1755, as amended, N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 194-199 (McKinney Supp. 1967)
(civil action instituted by industrial commissioner on behalf of employee and state).
20 For example, although the Illinois law has been on the books for nearly three
decades, not a single reported case has construed it. Comment, 1967 U. OF ILL. L.P.
202, 203 n.5 The same disability plagued early FEP laws. See Bonfield, The Origin
and Development of American Fair Employment Legislation, 52 IowA L. REV. 1043,
1049 (1967).
21WASH. REv. CODE § 49.12.175 (1963).
2 Ch. 29 [1949 ] Alas. Sess. Laws 80, now ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.10.155-.185
(1962); oh. 23 [1962] Ariz. Sess. Laws 36, now ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.340 &
.341 (Supp. 1967); Act 361 [1955] Ark. Acts 848, now ARK. STAT ANN. §§ 81-623
to -629 (1960); ch. 804 [1949] Cal. Stat. 1541, as amended, CAL. LABOR CODE §
1197.5 (West Supp. 1967); ch. 181 [1955] Clo. Sess. Laws 503, now CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 80-3-1 to -5 (1963); Pub. Act No. 289 [1949] Conn. Pub. Acts 261,
now CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-75 & -76 (1960); Act No. 581 [1966] Ga. Laws
582, now GA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-1001 to -1007 (Supp. 1967); Act 122 [1959] Hawaii
Sess. Laws 77, now HAwA REV. LAWS § 94-4.5 (Supp. 1965); ch. 114 [1966] Ky.
Acts 546, now Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 337.420-.433 (Supp. 1967); oh. 262 [1949]
Me. Laws 207, now ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 (Supp. 1967); oh. 568 [1966]
Md. Laws, now MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §§ 55 A-H (Supp. 1967); ch. 584, § 3
[1945] Mass. Acts 599, as amended, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 105 A-C (1965);
h.b. 636 [1963] Mo. Laws 416, now Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 290.400-460 (1965, Supp.
1967); ch. 193 [1947] N.H. Laws 257, now N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 275:36-:41
(1966); ch. 9 [1952] NJ. Laws 45, now NJ. STAT ANN. §§ 34:11-56.1 to .11
(1965); ch. 238 [1965] N.D. Laws 465, now N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-06.1-01 to -09
(Supp. 1967); h.b. No. 31 [1959] Ohio Laws 555, now Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§
4111.17 & .99 (Page 1965); ch. 193 [1955] Ore. Laws 209, now ORE. REv. STAT.
§§ 652.210-.230 (1967); oh. 1786 [1946] R.I. Acts 282, now R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§§ 28-6-17 to -21 (1956, Supp 1966); No. 196 [1963] Vt. Laws, now VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 495(5) (1967) (FEP law prohibiting wage discrimination on basis of sex);
ch. 92 [1965] W.Va. Acts, now W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5B-1 to -6 (1966); oh. 150
[1959] Wyo. Sess. Laws 208, now WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.210.1 to .4 (1967);
1.b. 474 [1967] Neb. Laws (CCH EMPLOYMENT P Acncns GuDE 4 25,170); ch.
64 [1966] S.D. Laws 87 (CCH EMPLOYMENT PRAcncEs GuIDE q 27,885); No. 544
[1947] Pa. Laws 1401 (repealed 1959), replaced by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 336.1-
.10 (1964).
13 Law of July 10, 1945, ch. 584, § 3 [1945] Mass. Acts 599, as amended,
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 105A-C (1965).
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statute,24 provided employees the opportunity to recover double damages
and attorney's fees and costs; made possible employee class actions; and
authorized the State Commissioner of Labor to sue on behalf of employees.
Similar equal pay activity was evidenced in Congress, where equal pay
bills were offered yearly from 1945.25 Such bills actually passed both
houses in 1962, but Senate-House conferees failed to resolve their dif-
ferences before adjournment.26 The following year brought passage of
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) ;27 but because of the FLSA's limited coverage, 28 only slightly
more than half of the "female nonsupervisory employees" were provided
with protection.29 The 1966 amendments to the FLSA, however, have
significantly broadened this coverage. 30 To the extent that the Equal
Pay Act would increase women's wages, some feared that it might actually
lessen female employment opportunities.31 This consequence was pre-
" See ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.10.155-.185 (1962); N.Y. LABoR LAw § 196 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-5B-1 to -6 (1966).
11 See generally Leopold, Federal Equal Pay Legislation, 6 LAB. L. 7 (1955).
Agitation for such federal legislation began during the nineteenth century, and ac-
tually found some congressional support. E. BAKER, supra note 8, at 411-12.
21 H.R. 11677 passed the House on July 25, 1962. 108 CONG. REc. 14782
(1962). A version of the same bill then passed the Senate on October 3, 1962. Id.
at 22085. Since the Senate version was passed as an amendment to an embassy con-
struction bill, however, it could not go to the appropriate conference where differ-
ences between the two equal pay bills could have been eliminated.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964).
See note 217 infra.
-
9Martin, Extent of Coverage under FLSA as Amended in 1966, 90 Mo. LAB.
REV. No. 4, 21, 22 (April 1967).
"The 1966 amendments, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206-07, 213 (Supp. II, 1965-66),
extended coverage to enterprises which typically employ more women than men:
hospitals, nursing homes, schools, hotels, restaurants and laundries. See generally
Kochin, Basic Provisions of the 1966 FLSA Amendments, 90 Mo. LAB. REv. No. 3,
1 (March 1967); Martin, supra note 29.
11 Congressman Findley feared that the effect of the equal pay bill's enactment
would be "to get women back home on the range . . . ." 109 CONG. Rnc. 9206
(1963). His anxiety was probably prompted by the predictions of a personnel ad-
ministrator before his committee. See Hearings on HR. 3861, supra note 8, at 106.
To insure that women would not be replaced by men, the Congressman offered an
amendment which would have permitted wage differentials which did "not exceed
[the] ascertainable and specific added cost resulting from employment of the op-
posite sex." 109 CONG. REc. 9217 (1963). The amendment was defeated, partly
on the ground that such a differential was permissible without the amendment. Cf.
S. REP. No. 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted at 109 CoNG. RFc. 8914,
8915 (1963), where the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare expressed
its feeling that such a wage differential is analogous to one based upon a bona fide
seniority system.
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cluded, however, by the unexpected inclusion of sex as a prohibited ground
for employment discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
When the House Rules Committee voted to clear the Administration's
comprehensive civil rights bill for debate on January 30, 1964, the bill
contained no prohibition of sex discrimination.32 After several attempts
to include a sex discrimination ban in other titles of the bill had failed, 33
Congressman Smith, an outspoken critic of the bill, proposed an amend-
ment to include sex as a proscribed ground of discrimination under the
equal employment section - Title VI.34 Admitting that the previous
amendments regarding sex had been "offered at inappropriate places in
the bill," Congressman Smith noted that sex discrimination in industry
was a serious problem.35 Even though every man voicing support for
"1H.R. 7152 was introduced in June, 1963, by Congressman Celler. Its weak
fair employment practice title, which merely provided statutory authority for the
already existing President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, see note
68 supra, was replaced by H.R. 405, which had already been favorably reported out
of the House Committee on Education and Labor. The enforcement provisions of
H.R. 405, contemplating an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with pow-
em similar to those of the National Labor Relations Board, were in turn replaced by
H.R. 10144 which limited the Commission to the role of prosecutor in trials de novo.
See generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS
39-50 (1965); P. Cromer, Sex Discrimination in Private Employment: The Conflict
between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and State Labor Laws for Women 23-32, 1967
(unpublished masters thesis, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania); Berg,
Equal Employment Opportunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 62, 64-66 (1964); Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & COMM.
L. REV. 431, 431-37 (1966).
Under the bill favorably reported out of the House Rules Committee, it was
apparently assumed that there would be no right to a jury at the trial de novo. See
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); 2 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2391, 2477 (1964) (separate minority views). Though the Senate stripped the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission of the power to bring suits itself, see text
accompanying notes 52-66 infra, there was never any suggestion -that jury trial would
be permissible under the new enforcement provisions.
ICongressman Dowdy, a Southern opponent of the bill, offered an amendment
which would have prohibited sex discrimination under the Public Accommodations
section of the bill. 110 CONG. REc. 1978 (1964). Denounced as a "diversionist"
tactic designed to make the legislation ultimately "unpalatable," id. at 1979 (remarks
of floor manager, Representative Celler), Dowdy's amendment was defeated 115 to
43. Id. Attempts by the same Congressman to include sex as a prohibited ground
of discrimination under the Public Facilities and Public Education titles met similar
fates. Id. at 2264-65, 2280-81. The Public Facilities amendment would have pro-
hibited discrimination on account of "sex or any other reason." Id. at 2264-65 (em-
phasis added).
"Id. at 2577.
"Id. The Congressman's own seriousness was brought into question when he
illustrated the plight of the American woman by reading a letter from a female
EV'ol. 1968: 671
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Smith's amendment ultimately voted against the House bill, 36 most of the
women in the House fully supported the amendment's serious adoption.
Echoing the sentiments of the female colleagues, 37 Congresswoman Kelly
asserted that "[i]n this amendment we seek equal opportunity in employ-
ment for women. No more - no less."38 Congresswoman Green, how-
ever, took the Administration's position opposing the amendment, 39 stating
the fear that the inclusion of sex would clutter up the bill and that "it
may later - very well - be used to help destroy this section of the bill
by some of the very people who today support it."40 Since the opponents
of the amendment failed to produce stronger arguments against its adop-
tion, the House accepted the sex provision by a comfortable margin 4 1
Despite the speedy House approval and initial support by opponents
of the bill as a whole, Title VII's sex discrimination provisions were the
product of serious legislative purpose. While accepting the sex amend-
constituent who lamented the fact that wars have killed off eligible males and created
a sexual imbalance in the population. She facetiously requested legislative protection
of every spinster's "right" to a husband and family. Id. Mr. Smith has since denied
that the amendment was "slipped in" to delay voting. Miller, Sex Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. Rav. 877, 883 n.34
(1967). On the contrary, Smith may well have desired the entire bill's swift defeat.
"The only Congressmen vocally supporting the amendment were Smith (of
Virginia), Dowdy, Tuten, Pool, Andrews (of Alabama), Rivers (of South Carolina),
Gary, Huddleston, Watson and Gathings. Their votes against H.R. 7152 are re-
corded at 110 CONG. Rac. 2804-05 (1964). Every man voicing opposition to the
sex amendment-Celler, Thompson (of New Jersey), Lindsay, Mathias and Roose-
velt-voted for the civil rights bill. Id. at 2804.
17 Congresswoman St. George reasoned that a sex discrimination ban would
make the fair employment title "comprehensive," "logical" and "right." Id. at 2581.
Contra, id. at 2578 (remarks of Congressman Celler, who called the sex amendment
"illogical, ill-timed, ill-placed, and improper"). Congresswoman Griffiths argued
that without a sex discrimination ban Title VII would further inhibit the white fe-
male worker by protecting only the Negro. Id. at 2579-80. See also id. at 2582 (re-
marks of Representative May).
I1 d. at 2583 (emphasis added).
"The Women's Bureau of the Department of Labor opposed the sex amend-
ment on the basis of the report of the President's Commission on the Status of
Women, which indicated that sex discrimination should be separately dealt with due
to its unique problems. Id. at 2577.
4I Id. at 2581. Congresswoman Green also noted that biological differences be-
tween the sexes result in the problems of sex discrimination being quite different
from those of racial discrimination and that therefore they demand special treatment.
Id. at 2584.
"
1 Id. at 2584 (adopted 168 to 133). Hasty adoption necessitated a corrective
amendment to include the word "sex" in certain parts of Title VII which Congress-
man Smith had overlooked, including the section dealing with the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification exception. Id. at 2720-21.
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ment, the House discriminatingly rejected a similar amendment to pro-
hibit age discrimination in employment - an addition equally pregnant
with diversionist possibilities. 42 Also, an effort to weaken the sex
discrimination provisions met with failure.43 Furthermore, the Senate's
retention of the sex provisions was apparently influenced by a rather
high level policy determination on the part of the Johnson administration,
reflecting a political acknowledgement of the fact that sex discrimination
had become a serious domestic problem.44
Statistics bear out the present need for Title VII's proscription of sex
discrimination in employment.45 The fair sex now accounts for over
one-third of the United States' civilian labor force, which includes nearly
one-half of the women between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four.46
Almost half of the five million American families headed by women live
near the poverty level.47 Equally startling is the fact that the 1964 median
wage for year-round, full-time women workers was only sixty percent
that of their male counterparts.48 Not only had this wage gap widened
during the preceding decade,49 but the proportionate increase of women
"Id. at 2596-99 (defeated 123 to 94). Although introduced by Representative
Dowdy, who had earlier attempted to have "sex" inserted in other titles of the bill,
see note 33 supra, the age amendment received the sincere backing of liberal Con-
gressman Pucinski, despite the views of some that it, like the sex recommendations,
was merely a diversionary tactic.
"1 110 CONG. RIc. 2728 (1964). Congressman Griffin's amendment, which
would have precluded consideration of sex discrimination charges unless the spouse
of the charging party was unemployed, was soundly defeated (96 to 15). Id.
"One commentator reports -that after Senator Dirksen announced his intention
to remove the sex provisions when the bill reached the Senate, Dr. Pauli Murray,
then a Senior Fellow at Yale University Law School, prepared a memorandum sup-
porting the amendment and distributed copies to Senators Margaret Chase Smith and
Maurine Neuberger, the Attorney General, and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson. Several
days later, Mrs. Johnson's secretary informed Dr. Murray that the sex provisions
would remain in the bill. P. Cromer, Sex Discrimination in Private Employment:
The Conflict between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and State Labor Laws for
Women 32-33, 1967 (unpublished masters thesis, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania).
" See generally Perella, Women in the Labor Force, 91 Mo. LAB. REV. No. I
(February 1968); Peterson, Working Women, 93 DAEDALUS 671 (Spring 1964).
"6 WOMEN'S BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BACKGROUND FACTS ON WOMEN
WORKERS IN THE UNrTED STATES (May 1966).
'7 WOMEN's BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN POVERTY-JoBs AND
THE NEED FOR JOBS (May 1967).
as BACKGROUND FACTS, supra note 46.
,In 1955 the median wage for year-round, full-time women workers was sixty-
four percent that of similarly employed males. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, UNDERUTrIIZATION OF WOMEN WORKERS (October 1964).
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in the work force was accompanied by a striking decline in their pro-
portionate share of technical and administrative positions.50 Despite
Title VIrs enactment, a serious underutilization of women in top man-
agement positions still exists,51 and it seems certain that efforts to eradi-
cate this and other manifestations of sex discrimination will be pursued
vigorously.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE SEX DIsCRIMINATIoN BAN
Although primary responsibility for urging compliance with Title VII
requirements rests with the five-member Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and its staff, actual enforcement of the Act is
delegated to private litigants, state agencies, the Attorney General, and
possibly other agencies of the federal government.52 Upon the filing of
a written charge of discrimination by either a private person "claiming
to be aggrieved" or a member of the EEOC, the Commission is authorized
to eliminate "by informal methods of conference, conciliation and per-
suasion" any discriminatory employment practice which it has reasonable
cause to believe exists.53 The charge must be filed with the Commission
" Prior to World War II, women constituted twenty-five percent of the labor
force and occupied forty-five percent of the professional and technical positions. They
now constitute thirty-five percent of the labor force but hold only thirty-six percent
of the professional and technical jobs. Id.
"EEOC Release, CCH EMPLOYMENT PRA6TICES GUME q 8192 [hereinafter
cited as CCH GumE] (statistical analysis of employment patterns among employers
in large cities who are subject to Title VTI).
"Title VII enforcement procedures have been dealt with thoroughly elsewhere.
See generally Walker, Title VII: Complaint and Enforcement Procedures and Relief
and Remedies, 7 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 495 (1966); Comment, Enforcement of
Fair Employment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 430
(1965).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1964). The charge is not to be made public, nor is
anything said or done during the conciliation effort to be made public or to be used
as evidence in any subsequent proceeding. Whether information discovered during
investigation of the charge may later be used as evidence is unclear. Presumably the
reason for barring from evidence information received during conciliation is that
cooperation would be inhibited. Since investigation of the charge is not dependent
upon cooperation by the discriminator, it would not seem necessary to bar the fruits
of investigation from later proceedings.
Although the original House version of Title VII provided the EEOC with
stronger enforcement power, see note 32 supra, the Senate "leadership compromise"
relegated the Commission to its present weak role of investigator and conciliator.
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 62, 66.68 (1964).
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within ninety days after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful practice,
and the Commission thereafter is given sixty days to secure voluntary
compliance. 54 If the Commission is unsuccessful, 55 it must so notify the
complaining party, who may institute a civil action in the federal courts
"within thirty days thereafter."56 If the court finds that the defendant has
For criticism of the individual complaint procedure and the use of secret con-
ciliation efforts see Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment Practice Commis-
sions: A Critical Analysis with Recommendations, 14 BuFFALO L. REv. 22 (1964).
5,42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(d), (e) (1964). These time limits are extended when
the EEOC defers to a local agency. The problem of deferral is considered in more
detail at text accompanying notes 63-66 inIra.
1 This short period has created a "time bind" which renders effective conciliatory
effort nearly impossible. Speech of EEOC Deputy Counsel Berg, 1965 Midwest
Labor Conference, Columbus, Ohio, paraphrased in 60 L.R.R.M. 81 (1966); see, e.g.,
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Va. 1967).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). Where the original complaint has been filed
by a member of the Commission, the action may be brought by any party "whom the
charge alleges was aggrieved." The filing of charges against the defendant with the
Commission has been quite uniformly held to be a prerequisite to the maintenance
of a Title VII civil action. E.g., Stebbins v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 382 F.2d
267 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 910 (1968); Mickel v. South Carolina
State Employment Service, 377 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877
(1967); Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
Several courts have concluded, however, that no actual conciliation efforts by the
EEOC are requisite to the maintenance of the civil action. Moody v. Albemarle
Paper Co., 271 F. Supp. 27, 29 (E.D.N.C. 1967); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 271
F. Supp. 842, 846-47 (E.D. Va. 1967); Reese v. Atlantic Steel Co., CCH GUIDE
41 9096, at 6842 (N.D. Ga. July 21, 1967); Evenson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 268
F. Supp. 29, 31 (E.D. Va. 1967); Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 260 F. Supp.
579, 580 (W.D. Tenn. 1966) (dictum). Contra, Mickel v. South Carolina State Em-
ployment Service, 377 F.2d 239, 242 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967);
Dent v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 265 F. Supp. 56, 58 (N.D. Ala. 1967). The
Dent court, in requiring actual conciliation efforts, reasoned that the sixty day con-
ciliation period "is properly to be accorded a directory rather than a mandatory con-
struction...." 265 F. Supp. at 58. Such an interpretation means that the charging
party may bring his action within thirty days of receiving notice from the EEOC
that conciliation efforts have failed-even if the Commission's notice comes long
after the expiration of the original sixty day period. Contra, Miller v. International
Paper Co., CCH GUm q 9093, at 6839 (S.D. Miss. November 9, 1967); Cunning-
ham v. Litton Industries, CCH Gurs q 9078, at 6806 (C.D. Cal. September 27,
1967).
The Miller-Cunningham requirement that suit be brought within ninety days of
the filing of the charge with the EEOC, coupled with holdings of those cases which
did not require actual conciliatory efforts, suggest a solution to the statute of limita-
tions problem. In order to prevent stale claims from reaching the courts, a sound
interpretation of the Act might be to require that the action be commenced within
ninety days of filing with the Commission. The court is presently authorized to stay
the proceedings for another two months pending Commission efforts to obtain volun-
tary compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). Under such procedure the EEOC
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intentionally discriminated in violation of the Act, it may enjoin that
practice and order "appropriate" affirmative relief such as reinstatement
or hiring, with or without back pay.57
Congress also recognized that the burden of bringing a private action
might weigh heavily upon persons in the lower income groups, who are
most often the objects of discrimination.58 Therefore, it included in Title
VII, provisions authorizing the courts, in their discretion, to appoint coun-
sel for the plaintiffs;59 to permit the action to be commenced without the
payment of fees, costs or security;PO and to allow the prevailing party
costs and a reasonable attorney's fee.61 Furthermore, the Attorney General
is authorized to intervene in any private action which he certifies to be "of
general public importance." 62
could be expected, as a matter of course, to notify the charging party at the end of
sixty days that conciliation efforts had not yet been successful. Requiring com-
mencement of the action within thirty days of the receipt of such notice would insure
that the discriminator would receive notice of the charge within six months of the
alleged discriminatory act (EEOC charge must be filed within ninety days of the
act; suit must be brought within ninety days of the filing with the EEOC). The
failure of the Commission to attempt conciliation within another sixty-day stay of
proceedings should not in that case be a bar to the action, since the Dent requirement
of actual conciliation effort seems to be at odds with the admittedly unclear legislative
intent. Both Senators Humphrey and Javits attempted to make it clear that Com-
mission effort was not requisite to the bringing of the civil action. 110 CoNG. REc.
14188, 14191 (1964).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964). There is apparently no right to trial by jury
in this judicial proceeding. See note 32 supra.
" See M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RAcIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT 33 (1966). Since women subjected to sex discrimination come from all strata
of society, many of them may be adequately equipped to bring private actions.
Social pressures may inhibit the professional woman, however. See White, Women
in the Law, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1051, 1108-09 (1967).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964).
0 Id.
:142 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1964).
02 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1964). The Attorney General is also authorized to
bring his own action whenever he "has reasonable cause to believe that any person
... is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the
rights secured by" Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1964). Until recently very few
such suits had been brought. However, the Justice Department anticipates a striking
increase in this type of litigation in the race area. See Bearing Down on Job Bias,
BusiNEss WEEK, Dec. 23, 1967, at 18. Because of the uncertainty of the sex dis-
crimination ban and because of the importance of alleviating racial discrimination,
however, the Attorney General has no present intention of bringing suits to enjoin
sex discrimination. Interview with Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Duke Univer-
sity School of Law, May 8, 1968.
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While creating a federal cause of action under Title VII, Congress
was also careful to preserve the primary role of the states. Thus, if an es-
tablished state or local agency may "grant or seek relief from" the alleged
discriminatory practice or may "institute criminal proceedings with respect
thereto," then no charge may be accepted by the EEOC until sixty days
after the commencement of state or local proceedings, unless those pro-
ceedings are earlier terminated.6 3 At the present time, fourteen states
and the District of Columbia have fair employment practice laws contain-
ing sex discrimination prohibitions substantially identical to the Title
VII ban.64 Along with investigation and conciliation procedures, most of
the FEP statutes provide for judicially enforceable administrative hearings
and orders - an enforcement procedure patterned after that of the Nation-
al Labor Relations Board.65 Because they generally possess greater
power than the EEOC, the state agencies may account for much of the
actual enforcement of the policy underlying Title VII's sex discrimination
ban.66
1142 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (c) (1964). The period of deferral is extended to
one hundred and twenty days during the state agency's first year of activity, and the
same deferral is required when the original charge is filed by a Commission member.
In deferral situations the charge must be filed with the EEOC within two hundred and
ten days after the discriminatory practice's occurrence or within thirty days of receiv-
ing notice that state proceedings have terminated, whichever is earlier. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(d) (1964).
It would not seem that a state determination against the charging party would
deprive him of further relief from the EEOC and the courts. See Comment, Enforce-
ment of Fair Employment under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Cm. L. Rv.
430, 440-42 (1965).
"The states are Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
The state FEP laws are fully cited in CCH GuiDE, 41 20,000. Alaska's FEP law
prohibits wage discrimination on account of sex and therefore is merely an equal
pay law. Where the charge alleges wage discrimination on account of sex, the EEOC
may be expected to defer to the state agency responsible for enforcing the state wage
legislation. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text. The Colorado FEP law
prohibits sex discrimination only in training and apprenticeship programs.
65See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-127 to -128 (Supp. 1967). Idaho
provides only criminal sanctions. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7303 (Supp. 1967).
Arizona provides initial administrative effort, but actual enforcement must be
achieved in a criminal proceeding. Axuz. R.Ev. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1481 to -1485 (Supp.
1967). Such a procedure renders the law very difficult to enforce. See Bonfield, The
Origin and Development of America's Fair Employment Legislation, 52 IowA L. REv.
1043, 1049 (1967); note 20 supra and accompanying text.
"'For a discussion of state enforcement procedures see Witherspoon, Civil
Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a Better Use of the Administrative
Process, 74 YALE L.J 1171, 1180-1205 (1965); Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes:
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In addition to the federal/state remedies specifically recognized by
Title VII, other federal remedies may be invoked to eliminate sex dis-
crimination in employment. Three weeks prior to Title VIi's final enact-
ment, the Senate rejected Senator Tower's amendment, which would have
made Title VII procedure the exclusive federal remedy for the proscribed
discriminatory practices. 67 Purportedly designed to give the EEOC pri-
mary jurisdiction over cases also subject to sanctions by the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO), 68 the amend-
ment was rejected on the grounds that its effect might be much more
"far-reaching, complex, and complicated." 69 However, the failure of the
Tower amendment also clearly demonstrates a Congressional desire to
avoid interference with the President's power to regulate discrimination.70
Executive authority, exercised since 1941, 71 presently prohibits employ-
ment discrimination by federal agencies, government contractors, and
federally assisted construction programs.72 Recently extended to express-
ly prohibit sex discrimination, 73 the Presidential regulation imposes heavy
sanctions for violations.74
Some Proposals, 49 IowA L. REv. 1067, 1110-20 (1964); Note, The Right to Equal
Treatment: Administration and Enforcement of Antidiscrimination Legislation, 74
H- v. L. REv. 526 (1961).
67 110 CoNe. REc. 13650-52 (1964) (amendment defeated 59 to 29).
"President Kennedy's CEEO was established in 1961 by Exec. Ord. No. 10925,
3 C.F.R. (1959-63 Comp.), and provided fairly effective regulation of government
and government contractor employment practices. See generally M. SovRN, supra
note 58, ch. 5, at 103-42 (1966); Means, Fair Employment Practice Legislation and
Enforcement in the United States, 93 INV'L LAB. REv. 211, 220-21 (1966). Shortly
before Kennedy's death the Committee's power was extended to the regulation of
discrimination in federally-assisted construction programs. Exec. Ord. No. 11114,
3 C.F.R. (1959-63 Comp.). Discrimination on account of sex, however, was never
prohibited under the CEEO.
Senator Tower suggested that his amendment would give the CEEO secondary
jurisdiction if the EEOC failed to investigate or had completed investigation. 110
CONG. REc. 13650 (1964).
0" 110 CONG. REC. 13651 (1964) (remarks of Senator Pastore). Senator Morse
expressed similar fears. Id.
1o The President's authority to regulate government employment was specifically
ratified in section 701(b). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964). His power to regulate
discrimination-on account of race, color, or national origin-is specifically ratified
by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
1 See generally M. SovFRN, supra note 58, ch. 5, at 103-42; Norgren, Govern-
ment Contracts and Fair Employment Practices, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 225
(1964).
Exec. Ord. No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. (1964-65 Comp.).
Exec. Ord. No. 11375, 3 C.F.R. (1967 Comp.).
The President's CEEO was abolished by Exec. Ord. No. 11246, supra note 72.
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Whether the rejection of the Tower amendment is indicative of a
Congressional intent to preserve other federal remedies is uncertain. Un-
der both the National Labor Relations75 and Railway Labor Acts, 76 a
union designated by a majority of the employees within an appropriate
bargaining unit is the exclusive representative of the entire unit and has a
corresponding duty to represent fairly all employees within the unit, with-
out irrelevant or invidious discrimination. 77 Though this prohibition ex-
tends to all types of discrimination,78 the Supreme Court has consistently
emphasized that the union is to be accorded a "wide range of reasonable-
ness" in balancing the competing interests of bargaining unit members.79
Not until 1962, when the NLRB held that a union's failure to fairly
represent constitutes an enjoinable unfair labor practice,80 did the duty
actually begin to weigh heavily upon labor organizations.81 During Con-
Presently the Civil Service Commission supervises the elimination of discrimination
in government employment. The Secretary of Labor administers 11246 provisions
relating to prime and first-tier government contractors. All government agencies
must include non-discrimination clauses in their contracts. The contractors, who are
subject -to investigation, must file compliance reports including information respecting
the membership policies of the unions with which they deal. Sanctions for violation
include contract termination, refusal of future contracts, publicity of violation, and
recommendation to the EEOC or Justice Department that proceedings be initiated.
Each executive agency is made independently responsible under 11246 for the elimina-
tion of discrimination in construction programs which they assist.
"129 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
7045 U.S.C. § 152(4th) (1964).
" Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955);
Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944) (NLRA); Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199-204 (1944) (RLA). Under the Syres case the duty ex-
tends to all unions who represent employees of businesses affecting commerce. Cox,
The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REv. 151, 154-55 (1957).
' Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S, 335,
342 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953).
"
9Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). Prior to the advent
of Title VII's sex discrimination ban, it was suggested that the union's discretion
would justify reasonable sex discrimination. Cox, supra note 77, at 161.
0 Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185-90 (1962), enforcement denied,
326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (majority of circuit court not passing upon Board's
theory). Miranda involved a white employee who alleged an arbitrary reduction in
his seniority. In Miranda and other cases, the Board has held that the employer is
also guilty of an unfair labor practice if he acquiesces in the union's breach of its
duty. This part of the Board's theory has never been passed upon by the courts, and
it has been the subject of thoughtful criticism. Comment, Discrimination and the
NLRB: The Scope of Board Power under Sections 8(a) (3) and 8(b) (2), 32 U. CIm.
L. Ray. 124 (1964).
8 The judiciary was only infrequently called upon to enforce the duty, presum-
ably because of litigation expense. See Sovern, Race Discrimination and the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act: The Brave New World of Miranda, N.Y.U. 16TH ANN. CONF.
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gressional debate on Title VII, Senator Clark stated in a memorandum
that it was "not entirely clear" whether racial discrimination was covered
by the NLRA. 82 The uncertainty was erased on the day before Title Vi's
enactment when the NLRB handed down the Hughes Tool Company
decision, which held that racial discrimination by a union constitutes an
unfair labor practice.83 Though it was persuasively argued that Title VII
enforcement procedures would be seriously undermined if the NLRB were
allowed to assert such jurisdiction, 84 the Board continued to apply the
Hughes theory,85 which has been upheld by the Fifth Circuit 86 and ratified
by three members of the Supreme Court in a recent concurring opinion. 7
As a final step, in the recent St. Louis Cordage Mills decision, -the NLRB
clearly implied that the duty of fair representation comprehends the obliga-
ON LAB. 3, 5-6 (1963). In lieu of the unfair labor practice theory, the NLRB has
abrogated the normal contract bar rules, Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962),
and revoked certification, Independent Metal Workers, Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.),
147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1577 (1964), where it has been shown that the union failed to
fairly represent bargaining unit members. It has been suggested that the NLRB
might also refuse to certify a union which discriminates. Sover, The National Labor
Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 563, 600 (1962). None
of these remedies is effective against a powerful union, which does not require con-
tract bar rule or certification protection. Sherman, Union's Duty of Fair Representa-
tion, 49 MiNN. L. REv. 771, 782-84 (1965). On the other hand, the unfair labor
practice theory provides swift, inexpensive, administrative enjoining of discrimination.
8-1110 CONG. REc. 7207 (1964). Senator Clark referred to the fact that the
NLRB was considering at that time a case involving racial discrimination.
83 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1574-75 (1964).
" Sherman, supra note 81, at 809-20. Such an argument seems to assume that
the political compromise which weakened EEOC enforcement powers is to be honored
under judicial interpretations of what the NLRA was intended to accomplish. More
direct attacks upon the Miranda theory have been made by pointing out that the
Taft-Hartley Act itself did not envision NLRB activity in the area of racial dis-
crimination. E.g., Albert, NLRB-FEPC?, 16 V '. L. RIv. 547, 550-52 (1963).
The so-called "suspicion of creativity," Molinar, The National Labor Relations Act
and Racial Discrimination, 7 B.C. Im. & CoM. L. Rnv. 601, 602 (1966), will be
further heightened if the Board finds that sex discrimination is an unfair labor prac-
tice. See Bankers Warehouse Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1199 (1964): "It is, of course,
not the purpose of the [National Labor Relations] Act to restrict an employer's
choice of employees based solely upon considerations of efficiency, work performance
or sex."
" Local 12, Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), affd, 368 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967), noted in 1967 DuKE LJ. 1037;
Local 1367, Longshoremen, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964), affd, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
"See note 85 supra.
"Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 198 (1967) (Fortas, J., joined by Warren, C.J.,
& Harlan, J.). Because the Court has denied certiorari in the Fifth Circuit cases,
however, there remains doubt as to the Court's position. See note 85 supra.
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tion to avoid sex discrimination which violates the Title VII command. 8
Whether the Supreme Court will eventually hold that a breach of the duty
of fair representation constitutes an unfair labor practice is an open ques-
tion, but it is likely that the NLRB will meanwhile apply Title VII
standards in its own determinations as to whether discrimination based
upon sex violates that duty.89
UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES BASED ON SEX
The basic thrust of Title VII is to delimit the activities of employers,
employment agencies and labor organizations by prohibiting various
"unlawful employment practices." An employer 90 brings himself within
11 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dac. (168 N.L.R.B. No. 135) q 22,003, at 28,923 (Dec.
21, 1967). When parties to a collective bargaining agreement extend that agreement
during its term, such a premature extension will not bar other unions from organiza-
tion efforts beyond the original term, unless the existing contract would not have
been a bar to an election. Delux Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995, 1001-02
(1958). However, in order to validate the extension under the Delux rule, the exist-
ing contract must have been invalid on its face without reference to extrinsic evidence.
Paragon Prods. Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662, 666-67 (1961).
In St. Louis Cordage Mills, the Board held that the contract was prematurely
extended since the contract was not invalid on its face-even though it limited jobs
on the basis of sex. Implying that sex discrimination in violation of Title VII would
render such a contract invalid as a bar to an election, the Board could not say that
the contract was invalid on its face since whether sex was a bona fide occupational
qualification for the jobs depended upon extrinsic evidence.
89 See Comment, Jurisdictional Conflicts in Minority Employment Relations:
NLRB and EEOC, 2 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 149, 158-63 (1967); Note, 1967 DUKE
LJ. 1037, 1045-54.
"Ile Act defines an "employer" to be "a person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce who has twenty-five or more employees. ... " Specifically exempted
are seasonal employers, the United States government and its wholly-owned corpora-
tions, states and their political subdivisions, and private membership clubs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1964).
The term "industry affecting commerce" is specifically defined to include "any
activity or industry 'affecting commerce' within the meaning of the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(h) (1964). The
1959 Act specifically incorporated the "affecting commerce" test of the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1964), which represents the fullest possible
exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. See Polish Nat'l
Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 647 (1944).
In comparison to Title VII, state FEP laws generally do not exempt the state
or its political subdivisions as "employers." E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-
122(f) (Supp. 1967). Contra, MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(b) (Supp. 1967).
Furthermore, the minimum number of employees which will bring a person within
the definition of "employer" is generally much less than twenty-five. E.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-122(f) (Supp. 1967) (three); HAwtI REv. LAws § 90A-1.5
(Supp. 1965) (one). Contra, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296,010 (Supp. 1967) (twenty-
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the purview of Title VII proscriptions when he discriminates against an
individual with respect to hiring, discharge, compensation, or other terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, because of the individual's sex,
race, color, religion, or national origin.91 Employment agencies92 and
labor organizations93 are similarly restrained with regard to their respective
referral, classification or membership policies.94 The Act's proscription
five). State exemptions are commonly made for private membership clubs, religious
organizations, and employers of domestic servants and family members. E.g., NEB.
REv. STAT. § 48-1101 (Supp. 1965).
1t Section 703 (a) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964) (em-
phasis added). Section 703 (d), which is somewhat overlapping, prohibits discrimina-
tion in training programs by employers, labor organizations and joint labor-manage-
ment committees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1964). Section 704(a) prohibits em-
ployer, labor organization or employment agency discrimination against any individual
because he has opposed an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a)
(1964). Section 704(b) declares it to be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print or publish any employ-
ment advertising or notice which indicates "any preference, limitation, specification,
or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... " 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1964) (emphasis added).
"The Act applies to all employment agencies regardless of size, if they regularly
undertake to procure employees for covered employers. United States agencies,
except for the United States Employment Service, and state or local agencies, except
those which are federally assisted, are specifically exempted. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(c)
(1964). State laws generally apply to all such agencies, private and public. E.g.,
Apiuz. REv. STAT. § 41-1461(2) (Supp. 1967).
11 A labor organization is covered if it is "engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce,... and includes any organization of any kind... in which employees partici-
pate and which exists for the purpose.., of dealing with employers...." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(d) (1964). Such an organization is deemed to be engaged in an industry
affecting commerce if (1) it maintains a hiring hall serving a covered employer, or
(2) it has twenty-five or more members and either represents employees of a covered
employer or is part of a parent organization which represents or actively seeks to
represent employees of a covered employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(e) (1964). State
laws generally cover such organizations without regard to their size or affect upon
commerce. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 18(d) (Supp. 1967).
0 Section 703(b) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employment agency [sic] to fall or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise
to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of
his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1964)
(emphasis added). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (1964), discussed in note 91 supra.
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of discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, or national origin, however,
is significantly different from the prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of race or color. Whereas employment discrimination on the basis of
race or color is unlawful per se, there "is a limited right to discriminate on
the basis of religion, sex, or national origin where the reason for the dis-
crimination is a bona fide occupational qualification." 95  Thus, determining
the legitimacy of sex discrimination requires a two-step analysis: first,
a definition of those practices which constitute discrimination on the basis
of sex, and which therefore fall within Title VII's ambit; and second, once
the initial outer limit has been fixed, a decision as to whether such activi-
ties are sanctioned by the bona fide occupational qualification exception.
The Meaning of Discrimination on Account of Sex
Inquiry into the breadth and content of the bona fide occupational
qualification exception is unnecessary unless the employment practice is
first found to be discriminatory. Despite the fact that certain Congress-
ional proponents of Title VII professed that discrimination could be
readily defined,96 that concept eludes precise isolation. Logic and legis-
lative history, however, provide certain guidelines which will aid in de-
termining whether "a difference in treatment or favor" indeed exist.97
(1) Discrimination may be accomplished by establishing a job quali-
fication which eliminates only members of one sex, or which is capable of
Section 703(c) provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a
labor organization-(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to
discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or
fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or
as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or (3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an individual in violation of [section 703j." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(c) (1964) (emphasis added). See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(d), -3 (1964),
discussed in note 91 supra.
"5 110 CONG. Rlc. 7213 (1964) (memorandum of Title VII's floor managers,
Senators Case and Clark). The substance of the bona fide occupational qualification
exception is discussed in text accompanying notes 120-200 infra.
"'A memorandum submitted by Senators Case and Clark defined discrimination
as "to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor." 110 CONG.
Rnc. 7213 (1964).
"7This approach to interpreting the meaning of discrimination is not without
precedent. See, e.g., State v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 227 La. 179, 187, 78 So.2d
825, 827 (1955).
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fulfillment only by members of one sex. A job qualification which elimi-
nates some members of only one sex, for example, would be the require-
ment that employees not have a physical characteristic which is biologically
peculiar to one sex - such as lack of pregnancy potential.98  The fact
that some members of both sexes could satisfy the qualification9 9 would
not save the requirement, since it penalizes only members of one sex. 100
However, not all job qualifications which eliminate only members of
one sex, or which only members of one sex can satisfy, should be considered
discriminatory. For example, an employer might refuse to hire graduates
of a certain woman's college.10' This standard, though it eliminates only
members of one sex, would not be sexual discrimination: first, because al-
most all members of both sexes could qualify for the job; and second, be-
cause qualification is not intimately linked with those genetic characteristics
which basically define sexual status. The practice of refusing to hire grad-
uates of any woman's college, however, would appear to be discrimination
on account of sex. Even though the employer is willing to employ female
graduates of coeducational institutions, he discriminates against women by
denying prospective female employees an option which has not been denied
to men-the option of attending other than a coeducational institution.
Equally discriminatory would be the practice of restricting employment to
graduates of a long list of colleges, all of which happen to be men's colleges.
" Disabilities unique to men, scientifically denominated as "recessive X-linked
traits," include red-green color blindness, hemophilia (factor VHI deficiency), and
G-6-PD deficiency. P. BEESON & W. McDERMOTT, TEXTOOK OF MEDICINE 1234
(Cecil-Loeb ed. 1963). Obviously, an absence of red-green color blindness could be
shown to be a bona fide occupational qualification for a job as an interior decorator.
The ease of justifying such a qualification, however, does not negate the fact that
it eliminates only members of one sex.
o1 In the case of pregnancy potential, hysterectomy would render a woman quite
fit for the job.
00 An analogous example of a qualification which only members of one sex
could meet would be a requirement that employees possess a physical characteristic
which is peculiar to one sex. Once again, the mere fact -that substantial numbers of
the favored sex are without the requisite characteristic would not save the standard.
The type of qualification under discussion is that which could be met by many
members of one sex and no members of the other sex, however. Therefore, a qualifi-
cation which can only be met by a few human beings (e.g., the ability to lift four
hundred pounds) is not discriminatory simply because those few human beings all
happen to be men.
... An analogous example of a qualification which only members of one sex
could meet would be the requirement that all employees be graduates of a certain
men's college. Such a standard seems a bit more discriminatory than the example in
the text since restricting employment to graduates of a certain men's college effective-
ly eliminates all women. Since very few men could meet the standard, however, it
would not appear to be sex discrimination.
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Whether or not job qualifications requiring training or experience
available only to members of one sex fall within the Act's general pro-
scription is an admittedly perplexing and unresolved question. Only a
general touchstone can be suggested: Insofar as the training qualification
admits many members of one sex and none of the other, or insofar as it
eliminates many members of one sex and none of the other, the qualifi-
cation seemingly constitutes sex discrimination violative of Title VII unless
justified by the bona fide occupational qualification exception.l °2
(2) Irrelevant job qualifications, having as their sole purpose the
intentional elimination of members of one sex, may be considered discrim-
inatory. The fact that Title VII enjoins only intentional discrimination 03
may actually broaden, rather than contract, 10 4 the Act's proscription.
Thus, an employer's intentional attempt to eliminate members of one sex
by establishing job qualifications which, in absence of such intent, would
110 The Act specifically sanctions one type of qualification which is based upon
experience commonly open primarily to men: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to repeal or modify any Federal, State, territorial, or local law creating
special rights or preferences for veterans." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11 (1964).
I" Judicial relief is available only if the court finds that "the respondent has
intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment
practice...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1964).
I'" It has been pointed out that "unintentional discrimination" is impossible since
discrimination "involves both an action and a reason for the action." Berg, Equal
Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REV.
62, 71 (1964). "However, in an effort to attach meaning to the word, some courts
may find in it a requirement that the respondent intended to violate Title VII, thus
permitting defenses based on ignorance of the law.... This would be an unfortu.
nate and incorrect result. 'Intentionally' means no more than that the asserted act
of discrimination must have been knowingly and deliberately based upon an
individual's ... sex...." Id.
Merely because an employer is not aware of the fact that red-green color blind-
ness is peculiar to one sex would not seem to render the sex discrimination uninten-
tional. See notes 98-102 supra and accompanying text. Once it had been established
that the qualification in fact discriminates on the basis of sex, the intent requirement
would be satisfied by showing that the employer intentionally established the qualifi-
cation. Excusing discrimination, which the employer is not astute enough to realize
is discrimination, seems no more justifiable than excusing a Title VII violaton merely
because the employer did not realize he is covered by the Act and that his conduct
constitutes an "unlawful employment practice." But see 110 CONo. REc. 12724
(1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey): "It means simply that the respondent must
have intended to discriminate." If one intends to do an act which constitutes sex
discrimination, however, it would seem that he intends to discriminate.
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not be discriminatory, 05 may constitute a violation of Title VII.10 6 For
example, a law firm which is so ardent in its desire to avoid hiring women
that it establishes the irrelevant job qualification that each new associate
must be capable of lifting a one-hundred pound weight over his head would
seemingly violate the Act.10 7  Even though such a strength requirement
would not normally be considered discrimination on account of sex, the
existence of an intent to discriminate renders the qualification unlawful;
"'The legislative history of Title VII indicates that job qualifications are not
normally discriminatory simply because proportionately fewer members of one sex
(or one race) than the other possess the qualification. Senator Case, Title VII's
floor manager, stated that an employer could lawfully require an applicant for em-
ployment as an engineer to have a Ph.D. despite the fact that few Negroes possess
such degrees. This very reasonable hypothetical was used to explain the broader
statement: "Whatever its merit as a socially desirable objective, Title VII would not
require ... an employer to lower or change the occupational qualifications he sets
for his employees simply because proportionately fewer Negroes than whites are
able to meet them." 110 CONG. REC. 6416 (1964) (emphasis added in order to
indicate that the Senator was not necessarily considering the establishment of new
qualifications designed to defeat the effect of -the Act). In another memorandum
Senator Case joined Senator Clark in stating: 'There is no requirement in Title VII
that employers abandon bona fide qualification tests where, because of differences
in background and education, members of some groups are able to perform better
on these tests than members of other groups. An employer may set his qualifications
as high as he likes. .. ." Id. at 7213 (emphasis added).
0I Such an interpretation of the Act perhaps may be supported by analogy to
the treatment of the fraud concept under the federal securities laws. Thus, a practice
in the securities field which is not fraudulent on its facts may be violative of rule
lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968),
if an intent to circumvent the protections of the Act is discovered. See, e.g., SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); A.T. Brod v. Perlow, 375
F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Finance Corp., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967).
Admittedly, a broad reading of Senator Clark's hypothetical, see note 105
supra, could be used to justify a weight-lifting test for lawyers. However, a Ph.D.
degree has a close rational relation to employment as an engineer. One wonders
whether the Senator would have distinguished the practice of an Alabama restaurant
which requires its waiters to have thin lips and inconspicuous cheek bones-physical
characteristics common to caucasians and rare among Negroes. Just as some caucasi-
ans would be eliminated by the thin-lip test, so would some outstanding male law
students be eliminated by the firm's weight-lifting test. Similarly, most Negroes and
most women would be eliminated by the respective tests. Another Senator suggested
that a qualification quite similar to the thin-lip test would be permissible where the
restriction has a rational relation to job performance. Senator Clark visualized a
movie company filming an "extravaganza on Africa," and stated that the director
could lawfully require that extras have "the physical appearance of a Negro-but
such a person might actually be a non-Negro." 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964).
Though Senator Clark's example primarily points up the analytical need for an
exception to racial discrimination where race is a bona fide occupational qualification,
it also indicates that requiring a physical qualification, such as thin lips or strength,
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and it is the irrelevancy of the qualification to performance of the par-
ticular job which establishes the intentional element. Such an interpretation
of the Act's ban should be narrowly construed since scrutinizing such
qualifications will entail difficult determinations as to which standards are
so intimately connected with sex that their irrelevant imposition will
render them discriminatory. 10 Only the most blatant irrelevancy should
spark the inquiry, and where the job qualification is at all rationally re-
lated to job performance, the court should recognize its validity and refuse
to hold that it constitutes discrimination.109
(3) Sex discrimination exists insofar as a woman is not accorded the
same freedom to "be a woman" that is accorded a man to "be a man."
Conversely, an employer has a right to insist that his employees conform
to their essential cultural-biological sex "roles." Ironically, in order to
avoid sex discrimination an employer must treat his male and female em-
ployees differently. This seeming contradiction is merely a function of the
fact that Title VIi's sex discrimination ban is an attempt to eliminate the
disparate treatment of two groups which are inherently and fundamentally
different. To the extent that the sexes are essentially different, an employer
discriminates on the basis of sex by requiring one sex to sacrifice that
basic difference to a greater degree than he requires of the opposite sex.
The difficult task is to ascertain which employment standards, because
of biology or culture, affront the basic sexual identity of one sex. Since
a sex discrimination proscription aims at the equality of the sexes, how-
ever, only those biological-cultural attributes absolutely basic to woman-
hood or manhood should be protected. Thus, although a specification
that all employees work bare-chested would constitute discriminatory
treatment of women, 1 0 a requirement that job applicants renounce any
may constitute discrimination which must be rationally justified. The reasonableness
of the qualification is evidential of the fact that the employer's purpose is not dis-
crimination while the irrelevancy of the qualification indicates that the employer's
sole purpose is to eliminate members of one sex, thus violating Title VII. Because
the irrelevancy of the qualification has been established, the bona fide occupational
qualification exception could provide no justification for the discrimination which
has been found.
"'At one extreme would be a requirement that employees be curvaceous-a
requirement effectively eliminating all but the most extraordinary males. However,
physical characteristics such as height, weight and strength are less discriminatory.
"o'9The long range effects of lowering genuinely necessary occupational qualifi-
cations should not be ignored. Cf. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363,
372-81 (1966).
"'1 Such an affront to female identity is based upon the structure of the female
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intention of quitting after a few years to manage a household and raise a
family would not seem discriminatory."' As regards the woman's mother-
homemaker role, respect for the cultural position of women should neces-
sitate that an employer hire mothers if he hires fathers," 2 but freedom to
be a mother should not include the larger role of housewife, a role com-
monly associated with motherhood, but not essential to basic female iden-
tity.113
The counterpart of the employer's duty to treat the sexes differently to
avoid discrimination arises in determining the degree to which a woman
can insist upon being treated exactly as a man. Although an employer
has the right to insist that his employees conform to their essential sexual
roles, the number of these roles should again be sharply limited in order
to retain the Act's basic policy of employment equality. Thus, until cigar
smoking becomes an acceptable part of the female cultural role, the em-
ployer may justifiably insist that his female employees refrain from such
smoking.114 On the other hand, the fact that numerous businessmen be-
lieve that business is incompatible with the female disposition 1 s does not
anatomy as well as upon our culture's high regard for sexual privacy. The essence
of the discrimination is that the standard denies the woman that which is essential
to her femininity. Thus, under most circumstances, requiring all employees to dress
or style their hair in a manner which is peculiar to one sex would constitute a dis-
criminatory invasion of the other sex's identity. Where female clothing would be
dangerous or impractical, however, there would be no discrimination in requiring
everyone to wear coveralls. In the presence of dangerous machines, a woman would
not be thought abnormal simply because she wears safe clothing.
"" Arguably, such a requirement discriminates against women since (1) only
women will be eliminated, and (2) this career pattern is common to women. The
answer to the first objection is that many members of both sexes can still qualify for
the position. See discussion in text accompanying note 102 supra. The second
argument can only be answered by stressing that such a career pattern is both in-
compatible with most jobs and inessential to the maintenance of sexual identity.
"I The EEOC has stated that a refusal to hire women with pre-school age
children unless the woman is divorced or putting her husband through college is
discriminatory. EEOC Digest of Legal Interpretations to Oct. 8, 1965, § .043, CCH
GuirE q 17,251.
121 See Rossi, Equality Between the Sexes: An Immodest Proposal, 93 DAEDALUS
614 (Spring 1964). See also NATIONAL MANPOWER COUNCIL, WoRK IN THE LIVs OF
MARRIED WomEN 74-207 (1959).
"" Perhaps in some areas of the country a woman in a given job would not be
thought of as abnormal because she smokes cigars. The hypothetical is merely used
to illustrate the reliance which must be placed upon basic cultural prejudices in order
to determine the existence of sex discrimination.
11r Such beliefs are apparently widespread. See Bowman, Worthy & Greyson,
Are Women Executives People?, 43 HARv. Bus. REv. 14 (July-August 1965).
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justify excluding women from employment in business on the basis that
such employment is not in conformity with the female sexual role.
(4) Title VII is primarily concerned with harmful discrimination, and
its overriding purpose is to improve female employment opportunity.
Although the preceding attempt to define discrimination analytically is
essential to an understanding of Title VII, it should be realized that the
Act speaks politically - in the context of a value judgment - and not
abstractly. Those who called for such legislation felt that discrimination
was a moral problem,116 and indeed the language of the Act reflects their
moral solution by prohibiting action or discrimination "against" individ-
uals.117 The Act prohibits not segregation or classification per se, but
rather such separation as "would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee... 2118
More specifically, Congress' overriding purpose was to improve the
lot of the woman worker: "a vote against this [sex] amendment today
by a white man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his daughter,
or his sister."119 In order to implement this policy, courts and adminis-
trative agencies enforcing the Act should subject practices which eliminate
female job opportunity to slightly more scrutiny than those which tend to
restrict male job opportunity.
Employment practices which result in the disparate treatment of the
sexes, and which therefore constitute "unlawful employment practices"
under Title VII, will be difficult to prove in many instances. Though the
absolute elimination or exclusive qualification of one sex will generally be
the best evidence of prohibited discrimination, other factors, such as pre-
vailing cultural attitudes or the presence of an intention to discriminate,
may also be employed to establish the existence of discrimination.
" Griswold, Foreword to DIsCIUMINATION AND THE LAW (V. Countryman ed.
1965): "Discrimination is basically a moral problem. We tend too often to
forget that." The book records the proceedings of a conference held the weekend
of President Kennedy's death concerning the problem of racial discrimination.
11742 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)-(d), e-3 (1964), quoted partly in notes 91 & 94
supra.
18 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (2), (c) (2) (1964) (emphasis added), cited note 91
supra. Therefore, since sexually segregated washrooms in no way connote inferiority,
such segregation is permissible. Other segregated facilities, such as lunchrooms, might
be considered discriminatory if they in any way diminish the employee's stature or
eliminate possibilities for advancement-such as the possiblity of eating lunch with
the boss.
119 110 CONG. REc. 2580 (1964) (remarks of Congresswoman Griffiths). See
also notes 37 & 38 supra and accompanying text.
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The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) Exception: Search for
a Rationale
Although initially determining the presence of discrimination will
involve difficulties, the magnitude of Title VIrs interdiction of sex dis-
crimination will depend primarily upon the interpretation given that
section of the Act which provides that some sex differentials are legiti-
mate "in those certain instances where.., sex.., is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of [a]
particular business or enterprise .... 1 20 Because statutory exceptions
are generally narrowly construed, 12' the burden of pleading 122 and prov-
ing 23 that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) should
"042 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964). Where it can be shown that sex, religion, or
national origin is such a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), the Act pro-
vides "it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees, for an employment agency to classify or refer for employment
any individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to classify or
refer for employment any individual, or for an employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retrain-
ing programs to admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis
of his religion, sex, or national origin... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964) (em-
phasis added). Further, section 704(b) provides that employment advertising may
specify such limitations where religion, sex, or national origin is a BFOQ. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(b) (1964). Perhaps the best statement as to the BFOQ's import has been
made by a recent commentator: "[T]he chief difficulty with the sex discrimination
ban of Title VII [is that] the law attempts to change some existing social mores
while retaining others, with the dividing line being extremely unclear... [T]he
Commission has the task of defining what the dividing line shall be under Title VII
by giving content to the phrase 'bona fide occupational qualification."' Oldham,
Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 DENvER L.J. 344, 364 n.104 (1967).
Another article has suggested that insofar as the BFOQ exception officially sanctions
sex discrimination in private employment, "this most important area of discrimination
against women may be brought within reach of the fifth amendment." Murray &
Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 232, 241-42 (1965). The Supreme Court does not seem sympathetic to this
view, however. See cases cited notes 171-72 infra and accompanying text.
'
1 See 2 1. SuTrmmAD, STATurras AND STATUTORY CoNsTRucTIoN §§ 4830,
4933, 4936-37 (1943, Supp. 1968).
2 Cf. Choate v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 274 F. Supp. 776, 777 n.3 (S.D. Ill.
1967). In this case the court held that the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleged
a cause of action when she pleaded that the defendant's agent had told her she would
not be hired as long as men were available. The court stated this was sufficient
despite the fact that she had not specifically alleged that the sole reason for the
refusal to hire was because of her sex.
' The general rule is that the party who "claims the benefits of an exception
to the prohibition of a statute" bears the burden of proving himself within the ex-
ception. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967). The
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properly rest upon the person accused of discrimination. However, the
quality and amount of proof requisite to carrying this burden remains
unclear.
Relying mainly upon certain segments of the BFOQ language, several
versions of the kind of proof necessary to take advantage of the exception
have been suggested. One court, ignoring the fact that the sex qualifica-
tion is to be "reasonably necessary" as well as "bona fide," held that an
employer's "honest purpose" in establishing an otherwise discriminatory
job requirement suffices to justify job denial on the basis of sex. 124 A
more restrictive interpretation is that an employer is limited to discrimina-
tion which "is rationally related to an end which he has a right to achieve
-production, profit, or business reputation .... 125 Although it is per-
haps difficult to improve upon a broad "reasonableness" test, the keystone
BFOQ language is deserving of more extensive analysis. It cannot be
said with certainty that Congress intended the short-run maximizing of
profit to be considered such a reasonable business necessity as would
justify all sex discrimination, irrespective of the cultural prejudices which
would have to be tolerated in order to achieve that goal. Rather, it
would seem that the meaning of "reasonably necessary" should depend
upon the balance of a variety of factors: 126 The necessity of a sex-oriented
job qualification to normal business operation must be weighed against
the extent to which the discrimination diminishes employment opportunity
burden of pleading and the burden of proof often go hand in hand because they
involve similar policy considerations. The party who discriminates has readier access
to the reasons for -his act. Furthermore, the party who wishes to discriminate on the
basis of broad assumptions concerning sex should be required to substantiate his
beliefs. See generally F. JAmS, CVmL PROCEDURE § 7.8, at 257-58 (1965).
124 Ward v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 260 F. Supp. 579, 581 (W.D. Tenn.
1966). In Ward a male employee sought transfer to a "light work" category re-
served for women and men with physical defects. The court accepted the defendant's
contention that the work would actually involve greater effort, but also added that
even if the plaintiff could have shown that the job would bring tangible benefit, he
would not be entitled to it because sex was a BFOQ for the position.
12' Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50
IowA L. REv. 778, 795-96 (1965). The commentator's standard seems doubtful in
light of the example which he provided: 'Thus, where a woman applies for a job
as a barber, the employer can establish his case merely by showing that hiring her
would cause him to lose a significant number of patrons." Id. No express consider-
ation is given to the possibility that the attitude may be susceptible of eradication,
and that the customers will only be lost temporarily.
I"0 The relative weight given to each factor will 'have to be determined from
case to case, and will be influenced by the particular industry, job, and job qualifi-
cation involved and by the underlying purposes of Title VII.
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for one sex, especially for women,127 and the likelihood that the reason for
the discrimination will disappear under the influence of equal employ-
ment opportunity. Two major conditions will bear upon the judicial
balancing of these factors in determining the reasonableness of sex dis-
crimination. First, each sex has certain biological and cultural character-
istics which may affect job performance. Second, many states legisla-
tively "protect" women workers, making them impossible or unprofitable
to employ.
(1) Sexual Characteristics as a BFOQ Basis
(a) Attributes Unique to One Sex
Each sex, besides having traits which are more characteristic of it than
of the opposite sex, 28 also possesses certain exclusive characteristics which
result from either biological endowment or cultural inducement. Although
it is impossible to differentiate completely between absolute biological char-
acteristics and those culturally induced, it is difficult to imagine situations
in which a basic physical prerequisite of gender would be essential to job
performance. 129 Thus, litigation concerning characteristics which are
allegedly unique to one sex will primarily entail the investigation of cul-
tural attitudes and expectations. The mere fact that a characteristic is
based upon cultural preference, however, should not weaken its stature
as an attribute possessed exclusively by one sex. 130
-'
2 The basic purpose of Title VIi's sex discrimination ban being to provide
better opportunity for women, it would seem that Congress was more concerned
with attitudes which restrict female employment opportunity than with attitudes
which tend to enhance it. Welfare legislation for women has been passed in many
states which restricts the employment of women. Enhancing these employment op-
portunities through federal legislation should certainly seem no more objectionable.
See note 119 supra and accompanying text. The state "protective" laws are dis-
cussed at notes 165-200 infra and accompanying text.
"8 Traits which are characteristic of one sex but also found in unusual members
of the opposite sex are discussed at notes 151-64 infra and accompanying text.
1'A hospital which renders "wet nurse" services or an artificial insemination
clinic perhaps provides an example of those unusual, employment opportunities which
absolutely require hiring on the basis of sex.
"
0 The fact that cultural preferences are probably never shared by all members
of the culture does not mean that unusual members of the "unpreferred" sex possess
the characteristic of cultural acceptance. Female attendants are not deprived of their
exclusive cultural acceptance in ladies' powder rooms simply because one woman in
a thousand actually prefers a male attendant. Rather than tending to prove that
some men might be found with this cultural acceptance, such evidence tends to
negate the existence of the attitude altogether-i.e., it tends to prove that males
would be as readily accepted as females in ladies' powder rooms.
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In determining whether a particular cultural attitude is a proper basis
for the BFOQ exception, three basic inquiries must be made. First, it
must be determined whether the attitude actually exists. Second, the
attitude must be shown to have a meaningful effect - in terms of profit -
upon job performance. 131 If it does, then the inquiry progresses to the
third and crucial issue: whether, in light of Title VII, the continued recog-
nition of the attitude is permissible. 13Z In deciding that question, it must
be kept in mind that Congress did not intend to eliminate all culturally-
induced sex attitudes in promulgating its sex discrimination prohibition.
Indeed, a key motivation for including sex in the BFOQ exception stemmed
from a willingness to allow employers to recognize such sexual distinc-
tions.133 Nevertheless, the insertion of "sex" in the BFOQ section surely
did not reflect a congressional desire to recognize the validity of all such
prejudices. 134
Among those attitudes which may have an effect upon job performance,
one which promises to receive great deference by the courts is the desire
x" Profit may be affected by the attitudes of other employees, who may work less
effectively-less productively-with members of one sex. The attitudes of clients
and customers may also limit profit.
.3 Factors to be weighed against business needs in determining if a particular
job qualification based on sex-oriented cultural attributes falls within the BFOQ
exception are enumerated at notes 126-27 supra and accompanying text.
"I During discussion of the corrective amendment, which added sex to the BFOQ
section, see note 41 supra and accompanying text, Congresswoman Green argued that
such a sex exception was necessary so that a college might hire only men for the
job of dean of men or so that a hospital might seek only a female nurse to care for
an elderly lady. 110 CONG. Rac. 2718, 2720-21 (1964).
I" Typical of the hypothetical examples used to illustrate the application of the
BFOQ language to the sex provisions was that offered by Senators Case and Clark,
floor managers of the bill: The exception would permit a male baseball team to hire
male players. 110 CONG. Rac. 7213 (1964) (memorandum). Such application of
the BFOQ is fairly innocuous. Not only does it not threaten female employment
opportunity to any significant degree (it is difficult to imagine the Amazon who
could qualify on the merits anyway), but such application could easily be based upon
considerations other than player or crowd attitude, such as the cost of installing
additional dressing-room facilities. But see Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (a)(1)(iv) (1968).
The EEOC has stated that the "preferences" of co-workers, employers, custom-
ers, or clients do not constitute appropriate BFOQ bases. Id. at § 1604.1(a) (1) (iii).
However, its position is somewhat clouded since it has also stated that sex will be a
BFOQ where it "is necessary for purposes of authenticity or genuineness." Id. at
§ 1604.1(a) (2). This exception, however, seems to extend only to fashion models
and actresses or actors. See id. at § 1604.1(a). The EEOC has recently held that
sex is not a BFOQ for the position of flight cabin attendant-stewardess. Decision of
the EEOC, February 21, 1968, CCH Gurmn 4 17,304.63.
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to be free of intimate sexual exposure to members of the opposite sex.
Thus, a recent arbitration decision held that it was proper for a hospital
to refuse to hire male licensed vocational nurses because such personnel
would not be tolerated by female patients to whom they would be re-
quired to render intimate personal care. 135 Though that decision is seem-
ingly in line with Title VIrs legislative intent, 136 there may be limits upon
the use of sexual privacy to justify sex-based job qualifications. For ex-
ample, because of the burden it would place upon employment oppor-
tunity, the desire of female patients to retain their modesty might not
justify the refusal to employ a male anesthetist.
Another biological-cultural characteristic which may be of proper
concern to an employer is the female vulnerability to sexual assault.' 37
" Kaiser Foundation Hosps. & Medical Centers v. Building Serv. Employees
Local 399, 67-2 CCH LAB. ARn. AwARDs 4665, 4670 (1967). In the Kaiser decision
the arbitrator apparently assumed that the issue was whether the refusal to promote
violated Title VII. Other arbitrators, however, have refused to consider the impact
of Title VII on the grounds that this is beyond their jurisdiction if compliance with
the law has not been agreed upon between the parties to the collective bargaining
agreement. Mead Corp. v. UMW Local 12943, 65-2 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs 5329
(1965); see United Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 67-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs
3720 (1967); Eaton Mfg. Co. v. Automobile Workers Local 263, 66-3 CCH LAB.
ARB. AwARDs 6795 (1966). A contrary decision was made in National Lead Co. v.
Teamsters Local 270, 67-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AwARDs 3458 (undated). Although the
collective bargaining agreement contained no non-discrimination clause, the arbi-
trators felt that such a grievance was arbitrable since "any agreement entered into
must be considered in light of statutory obligations which are effective at the time
the agreement is signed or which become effective during the period the contract is
in effect...." Id. at 3460. See also Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
65-2 CCH LAB. Ann. AwAnDs 5434 (1965). Although the National Lead decision
is perhaps explainable on the grounds that the agreement contained a very broad
arbitration clause, such a decision may threaten the integrity of the arbitration pro-
cedure--especially where applicable law has not been clearly interpreted in the
courts. On the other hand, because courts may place reliance upon the legal inter-
pretations of arbitrators, difficulties may arise when the arbitrator refuses to give
effect to Title VII. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 277 F. Supp. 117,
118-19 (S.D. Ga. 1967). Where a clause in the agreement forbids sex discrimination,
the arbitrator will apparently feel free to apply Title VII. See Buco Prods., Inc. v.
Automobile Workers Local 985, 66-3 CCH LAB. AR. AwARDs 6524 (1966).
"I See note 133 supra and accompanying text. However, the suggestion made
in the House was that a hospital could seek a female to care for an elderly lady.
Such a patient might be more sensitive to exposure to a male nurse than younger
women who are less modest. Furthermore, it would seem that patient attitudes
could be respected by limiting the male nurse to male patients.
"I Though males are sometimes sexually assaulted, this does not negate the fact
that in our culture it is the female who is endangered. No male-even the one who
is assaulted-has the characteristic of being the normal object of ravishment. The
cultural "preference" is always for the female. See note 130 supra.
Vol. 1968: 671]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
The EEOC has indicated that a publisher might reasonably refuse to em-
ploy female minors as newspaper carriers where there is reason to believe
that they will be subjected to possible physical or moral hazard. 138 More-
over, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company,139 the
court determined, in dicta, that a refusal to hire a female as a "switchman"
was reasonable because such an employee was required to be on twenty-
four hour call, which frequently would have necessitated working alone
during the late hours of the night 140  The possible implication is that
hiring restrictions may be legitimately imposed upon jobs which involve
an unusually high possibility of rape or assault. It would seem that an
employer has a legitimate interest in restricting such potentially hazardous
employment, especially in a service industry, where an attack upon an un-
protected female could cause a backlash of public outrage, seriously af-
fecting the employer's business. Alternatively, the cost of providing ade-
quate protection would significantly diminish the financial practicality of
employing female workers. In such cases, an employer would be justified
in establishing hiring differentials based upon sex. 141
The same cultural "preferences" which render the female sexually
vulnerable may, in other situations, render the employment of women
desirable. Female sex appeal, perhaps the world's oldest and most effec-
tive marketing device, promises to endure as a cultural attitude despite
congressional legislation. Indeed, the continued recognition of female
sex appeal as an occupational qualification implements the basic policy
of Title VII to provide better employment opportunities for women. 142
To suppose that Congress intended to destroy the competitive advantage
of female sex appeal, even where that quality enhances business profits, is
to ignore this basic purpose. Such reasoning was seemingly approved in
Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Incorporated,143 where a district court strongly
1 88G.C. Op. Ltr. Aug. 19, 1966, CCH GmDE q 17,304.24.
277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967).1 Id, at 118.
141 In a related situation, it might be argued that since laboring men often use
abusive language, women should not be permitted to work with them. However, even
if women are generally somewhat more offended by such language, the possible harm
would not seem to be so great as to justify denying women employment in such
situations. The EEOC agrees that the danger of "argumentive discussions" should
not be allowed to bar female employment in areas largely staffed by males. Digest
of EEOC Legal Interpretations, October 1965-March 1966 § .04, CCH GUInDn
q 17,252.
142 See note 119 supra.
113 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
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implied that sex may remain a valid basis for hiring flight cabin attend-
ants. Specifically disclaiming that it was dealing with the BFOQ excep-
tion, the court nevertheless stated:
Congress did not outlaw Delta's discretion to hire only stewardesses who
are single and young, 20 to 26 years of age, average height... slim...
educated ... have "good complexions," must be "neat," must be "attrac-
tive," and their "family background" and "moral character" must be
"good."144
Although the EEOC apparently disagrees,145 the implication of the Cooper
case would seem to be the better view.
However, the desire of patrons or clients to be served by a male
would seem to be distinguishable from female sex appeal and probably
would not justify the application of the BFOQ exception. Whereas
female sex appeal is based rather directly upon physical characteristics,
the desire of patrons to deal with a man is frequently based upon sup-
posed mental or emotional differences between the sexes.146 In Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Company,147 an Indiana district court, though readily
acknowledging the general physical limitations of women, suggested that
perhaps "stereotyped characteristics of taste or talent or emotions or tactile
facility and the like cannot be made the basis for generic classification" of
the sexes. 148 The court's position may reflect its unwillingness to assume
that such differences exist between the sexes absent scientific proof. Such
a judicial attitude may be readily sustained on the basis of Congress' ob-
vious desire to promote equality in employment opportunity.14 9 Accord-
ingly, courts may consider attitudes based upon physical differences to be
more legitimate than those grounded upon mental or emotional differ-
ences. Further, insofar as the courts may doubt that women possess a
lesser degree of business capability, they may look to equal employment
opportunity to eventually eliminate that attitude itself.1 -0 This considera-
"I Id. at 782.
"
5 See note 134 supra.
14
G Men may also desire to deal with another male for reasons of sexual privacy
or modesty and job qualification resting on this ground may be sustained. See notes
135 & 136 supra and accompanying text.
117 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
118 Id. at 365.
'-"See notes 116-19, 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
"'One commentator suggests that the employer can mitigate the loss resulting
from client prejudice by carefully exposing his female employee to his clients. White,
Women in the Law, 65 Mica. L. REv. 1051, 1097-98 (1967).
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tion would tend to negate use of the attitude as a BFOQ basis, despite the
fact that it presently has a substantial effect upon job performance.
(b) Traits Characteristic of One Sex but also Found in Unusual Mem-
bers of the Opposite Sex
Certain characteristics, though more common to one sex, are also
found in unusual members of the opposite sex. Once having ascertained
that such a characteristic meaningfully affects job performance, 151 a policy
question must be resolved in determining whether the characteristic in-
vokes the BFOQ exception: does an employer retain the right to hire
and employ on the basis of general, but not universal characteristics, or
must he seek out unusual members of the normally deficient sex? Though
the intent of Congress was never made clear, two factors would seem to
be of primary importance: (1) the difficulty - and consequent cost -
of determining individual capacity with respect to the characteristic, and
(2) the likelihood that the characteristic is a mere result of occupational
discrimination, so that the sexes will become equally competent under
the influence of equal employment opportunity.
One type of sexual characteristic which may not justify discrimination
could be denominated "general employment characteristics"-- those based
upon the comparative working patterns of men and women. These work-
ing patterns, primarily turnover and absenteeism rates, would be a signifi-
cant business consideration in establishing employment criteria for any job.
In this respect, general employment characteristics differ from sex-related
aptitudes and abilities, such as strength or dexterity, which are requisite for
only certain jobs. The EEOC has taken the position that "assumptions
of the comparative employment characteristic of women in general" can-
not be made the basis for hiring differentials under the BFOQ excep-
tion. 152 Though such a position may appear analytically too rigid,153 its
v/ 11 The test of a characteristic's effect upon job performance is applied in con-
sidering attributes unique to one sex. See discussion in text preceding note 131 supra.
The existence and significance of the characteristic should be proven by the party
who wishes to bring himself within the BFOQ exception. See note 123 supra. Such
a burden may be difficult to carry without extensive statistical data.
12 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1) (i)
(1968) (emphasis added).
"' A preferable reading of the EEOC guideline is that an "assumption" con-
stitutes "a generalization made without a sufficient foundation of supporting experi-
ence." White, Women in the Law, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 1051, 1104 (1967). However,
the EEOC does not assent to such an interpretation of its guideline, feeling that every
person should be "considered on the basis of individual capacities and not on the
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application seems satisfactory in a practical sense, since work pattern dif-
ferences between male and female workers have been shown to be far
less significant than frequently claimed. 154 Furthermore, absenteeism and
turnover rate differentials may be susceptible of eradication insofar as
equality of opportunity would provide greater incentive to work outside
the home.155 Although contrary to the EEOC position, significant dif-
ferences between the employment patterns of men and women should
constitute a valid basis for the BFOQ exception. The employer, however,
should bear the burden of qualifying for the exception by showing (1)
that his statistics compare men and women in equal job categories, and (2)
that business considerations make it reasonably necessary to employ on
the basis of such working patterns. The difficulty of carrying such a bur-
den of proof should be sufficient to prevent unjustifiable discrimination.
Though the very existence of general employment characteristics for
a particular sex may be doubted, certain abilities and aptitudes character-
istic of one sex may be considered proper bases for the BFOQ exception
because of the certainty of their existence and impact upon job perform-
ance. The EEOC, however, has voiced disapproval of such a view in
asserting that "stereotyped characterizations of the sexes" are not to be
considered legitimate BFOQ bases.'5 6 Despite its general rule, the Coin-
basis of any characteristics generally attributed to the group." Guidelines on Dis-
crimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a)(1)(ii) (1968).
"I The frequent claims that women have far higher turnover and absenteeism
rates than men, see, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 3861 and Related Bills before the Special
Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 95-108,
184-86, 241-49 (1963) (testimony of businessmen on the need for a "cost justifica-
tion exception" in Equal Pay Act), are generally based upon statistics which do not
account for the fact that the women being compared are in lower job categories than
the men. See WoMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WHAT ABOUT WOMEN'S
ABSENTEEISM AND LABOR TURNOVER? (revised August 1965); Hearings on H.R. 3861,
supra, at 241-47 (committee member's remarks on data presented). Furthermore such
claims usually announce differentials far higher than have been substantiated by
independent study. See PUBLIC HEALTH SERvICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION
AND WELFARE, WORKTIME LOST THROUGHOUT THE ECONOMY, JULY 1959-JuNE 1960
(1960); White, Women in the Law, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 1051, 1090-92 (1967).
"' Perhaps, however, more study is needed before such a conclusion can be
drawn. See White, Women in the Law, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 1051, 1092 (1967). It
has been suggested that the theory that women seek work which does not threaten
their major role as wife and mother is not necessarily valid. E. Gross, Plus Ca
Change . . . The Sexual Structure of Occupations over Time, August 30, 1967
(revision of paper read at 62nd annual meeting of American Sociological Associa-
tion, Department of Sociology, University of Washington).
""Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(a) (1) (ii)
(1968).
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mission has indicated a slight hesitancy in applying such a standard to
jobs which require physical strength.157 Such restraint is justified in light
of Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Company,158 which held that an employer
could bar his female employees from jobs requiring the regular lifting of
over thirty-five pounds. Acknowledging "general and generally recog-
nized and basic differences in the physical characteristics, abilities, capac-
ities, restrictions and limitations of the respective sexes,"' 59 the court rea-
soned that individual consideration of each woman could only result in
interminable dissension ...which, under the peculiar system now a
part of the normal operation of Colgate's plant, would make it utterly
impractical and virutally impossible to achieve any reasonable operation
of the plant.160
The court's emphasis upon the "peculiar" nature of Colgate's seniority sys-
tem, which involved a weekly "crewing up" process necessitated by the
fact that the same products were not produced each week, seems entirely
unwarranted. Women restricted to "light" work classification can be ex-
pected to complain irrespective of whether or not jobs change weekly, if
other women are permitted to engage in "heavy" work. Once the job
structure between "light" and "heavy" has been classified, the issue simply
becomes whether or not capable women may be restricted from working
in the "heavy" classification. The reasonableness of such a policy should
chiefly involve consideration of the expense and difficulty of ascertaining
the existence of the desired characteristic. The Bowe case involved a
characteristic which might very easily be determined-strength. 161 Where
the job requires, in addition to strength, qualities such as speed and en-
durance, then the female might be given a short trial period or a medical
examination. Such reasonable alternatives to an outright refusal to hire
'-5 See G.C. Op. Ltr., July 28, 1966, CCII GUIDn q 17,304.07: "The Commission
is not as yet prepared to conclude that the physical requirements involved in a job
may justify denying consideration to qualified members of either sex." (emphasis
added).
272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
160 Id. at 357. Weekly job assignments were based upon departmental seniority.
Surplus labor in one department was "forced out" and assigned to jobs in other
departments on the basis of plant-wide seniority. Female "bumping" rights-the
right to displace another on the basis of seniority-were of course limited by the
weight lifting restriction. Id. at 341-47.
"I Many women could quickly prove their ability to lift over thirty-five pounds
by simply performing the feat.
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have been suggested by arbitration decisions. 162 However, if the testing
procedure resulted in great expense while discovering few qualified women,
then an employer might be permitted to adopt a more generalized sex-
oriented standard. 163
Insofar as Bowe drew a distinction between generally recognized phy-
sical differences between the sexes and possible mental or emotional dif-
ferences, 164 the judiciary may not be amenable to the suggestion that
women and men are different in their mental and emotional perform-
ance. However, where such differences can be proven to exist, the em-
ployer may more easily show the business necessity of avoiding the cost
of discovering the unusual individual, since it may be far more expensive
to ascertain the emotional stability of an individual than it is to determine
his mere physical strength.
(2) State Protective Legislation as a BFOQ Basis
A second major factor which may effect the dimensions of Title VIl's
BFOQ exception is the existence of state regulations upon the conditions
of female employment-so-called "protective legislation." Common since
the beginning of this century, such laws were presumably enacted for the
purpose of protecting women from "sweat shop" conditions,165 and there-
fore frequently restrict the occupations which women may pursue,166
""International Paper Co. v. Papermakers Local 398, 66-3 CCII 1AD. ADD.
AwARDs 6535 (1966); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship
Clerks, 66-1 CCH LAB. ARB. AwAiRns 4180 (1966) (trial period); Miami Copper Co.
v. Steelworkers Local 4338, 65-1 CCII LAB. ARB. AwARDs 3719 (1965) (trial period).
See also Buco Prods., Inc. v. Automobile Workers Local 985, 66-3 CCH LAB. ARB.
AwARDs 6524 (1966) (job bid denial violates agreement not to discriminate on
grounds female has necessary strength).
"I Proof of the unreasonableness of requiring the employer to seek out unusual
women would justify a BFOQ exception. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
I'l See notes 148-50 supra and accompanying text.
"Or'See WOMEN's BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T oF LABOR, BULL. No. 66, HISTORY OF
LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN 1N THREE STATES (1929), which suggests that some
exclusionary legislation, see note 166 infra, is actually the product of craft union
attempts at self-protection. See also note 10 supra.
200 Employment of women in mines, quarries and similar places is prohibited in
a number of states. E.g., Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-261 (1956); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 52, § 701-299.1 (1966) (clerical work permitted); VA. CoDE ANN. § 45.1-32
(1967) (clerical work exception removed in 1966). Weight lifting limits for women
are established by statute in a few states. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1251, § 1252
(1955) (50 lb. normal lifting, 10 lb. on stairs); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 4107.43
,(Page 1965) (25 lb. on repeated basis). Bartending is prohibited in several states. E.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-81 (1960) (unless wife or daughter of proprietor);
Nav. RPv. STAT. § 244.350(2) (d) (1965) (county liquor board may prohibit female
employment); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 3-8-2 (Supp. 1967) (unless 21 years old and
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regulate the hours and times they may work,167 establish the minimum
wife, widow, daughter, or sister of proprietor). Occasionally the employment of
female minors in certain capacities is forbidden. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:169
(1964) (newspaper carriers). Other statutes establish a higher eligibility age for
girls than for boys in certain "street trades," such as vendors and messengers. E.g.,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:164, 165 (1964); Ws. STAT. ANN. § 103.23 (1957).
Other statutes prohibit female work in specific crafts, but the most comprehensive of
these is the Ohio statute which prohibits females in the following occupations or
capacities: "Crossing watchman, section hand, express driver, metal moulder, bell
hop, taxi driver except [during day], gas or electric meter reader, as workers in blast
furnaces, smelters, mines, or quarries except in the offices thereof, in shoe shining
parlors, bowling alleys as pin setters, poolrooms, barrooms and saloons or public
drinking places which cater to male customers exclusively, in delivery service on
motor propelled vehicles of over one ton capacity, in operating freight or baggage
elevators if such elevators and the doors thereof are not automatically or semi-
automatically controlled, in baggage handling, freight handling, trucking, and handling
by means of hand trucks heavy materials of any kind, or in employments requiring
frequent or repeated lifting of weights over twenty-five pounds." Ono REv. CODE
ANN. § 4107.43 (Page 1965).
16? Most states currently fix the maximum number of hours which women may
work during a given period of time. Some statutes fix a maximum for women em-
ployees generally and then provide that certain occupations, such as nurses and
telephone operators, are not to be limited by the normal maximum. E.g., ILL. ANN.
SrAT. ch. 48, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1950); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 181.18 (1966); UT, u
CODE ANN. § 34-4-3 (1966). Other statutes fix maximum hours for women in certain
establishments, such as factories or retail stores, and then proceed to exempt women
who work in professional, administrative or other special capacities. E.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-12, -13, -18 (Supp. 1966); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:311,
331, 332, 337 (1964); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5172(a), §§ 1-3 (1962); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 440 (1967); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 27-218 (1967). A few states
delegate regulation to an administrative agency. E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 103.02
(Supp. 1968).
Rest periods and lunch periods for women are frequently required. E.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 81-410, -609 (1960); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 337.365 (1963); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 107 (Supp. 1967). Additionally, restrictions on night work
are common. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-19 (1960); N.J STAT. ANN.
§ 34:2-28 (Supp. 1966); N.Y. LABoR LAW § 173 (McKinney Supp. 1967). Related
statutes occasionally forbid employment of women shortly before and after childbirth.
E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31:26 (1960); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.060 (1965).
Exceptions to the hours laws are numerous. Often the statute will allow longer
hours during emergencies, or seasonal peaks. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-13
(1960); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 733 (1965). Similar exemptions are made
for seasonal businesses such as canning plants and tobacco warehouses. E.g., ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 5 (Smith-Hurd 1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-17 (Supp. 1967),
Domestics are frequently exempted. E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 6993 (1953); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59-5-4 (1960). A somewhat analogous exemption is sometimes made
for persons employed in towns under a certain population. E.g., NED. Rnv. STAT.
§ 48-203 (1960). Longer hours are occasionally permitted if premium pay is paid
for overtime. E.g., IDAHo CODE ANN. § 44-1107 (Supp. 1967); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 27-218 (1967). Increasingly, professional, administrative and sometimes clerical
workers are being exempted. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1352.1 (West Supp. 1967);
SEX DISCRIMINATION
wage they must be paid,168 and require that certain facilities be pro-
vided at places of employment for their health, safety, privacy and
comfort.169 While it has been persuasively argued that the limits these
laws place upon female employment opportunity abridge the constitutional
guarantees of due process and equal protection, 70 the Supreme Court
has traditionally rejected such claims. 17' In light of the Court's present
reluctance to strike down state economic legislation on fourteenth amend-
ment grounds,172 it seems unlikely that the Court will soon reverse its
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-12 (Supp. 1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-35 (Supp.
1966).
Some of the hours laws are ineffective since excess hours may be worked in the
employ of a second employer-absent, of course, the advantage of premium pay.
See Reynolds v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., Op. & Ord., Arizona Civil Rights
Comm'n, Case No. 17-12E (December 2, 1966) CCH GUIDE q 8111, at 6184. This
defect is avoided by a few laws. E.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1351 (West Supp. 1967).
"08 Only two states actually establish the minimum wage for women by statute.
NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 609.030, .040 (1965) ($1.25 per hour); S.D. CODE § 17.0607
(Supp. 1960) ($15 per week in cities with population over 2500). Much more com-
mon is the creation of an administrative agency or commission that establishes
a binding minimum wage for women. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-613 to -619
(1960); CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1171-1198 (West 1955); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 43,
§§ 331 a-o (1964).
""' State law commonly requires that women be provided with separate toilets,
dressing rooms and similar facilities. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-2-10 (1963);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 25-3 (1964) ("retiring rooms"). Many states require that
seats be provided and that women be allowed to use them when not actively engaged
in work. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 337 (1958); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 735
(1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-33 (Supp. 1966). A few states require that stairs be
screened, presumably for the privacy of female users. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §
292.150 (1965). Other states require certain safety facilities, such as pulleys for
heavy lifting and handrails on stairs. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 53, 54
(1965); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5176 (1962). Healthful and safe conditions
are required in several states, and administrative agencies are established to determine
and enforce the standards. E.g., COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-7-3, -5 to -11 (1963).
Wisconsin requires that employers of women keep special records, which is a
burden analogous to the requirement of special facilities. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 104.09
(Supp. 1968).
170 Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title
VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 237-42 (1965).
17' See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (6-3 decision upholding
state statute prohibiting female bartenders); cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379 (1937) (5-4 decision upholding state regulation of women's wages).
12The court last invalidated state economic legislation on substantive due
process grounds in Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937). In
recent Supreme Court history, only once has the equal protection clause been the
basis for successful attack upon state economic legislation. Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957). The Court has apparently "abdicated the field." See McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962
Sup. CT. REv. 34, 38, 59.
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position on state female employment restrictions. The enactment of Title
VII, however, provides the Court with an alternative basis for invalidat-
ing these laws, for insofar as they render women impossible or unprofit-
able to employ, such regulations conflict with the obligations imposed
by Title VII. Therefore, either employers should be insulated from liabil-
ity under state law, on the grounds that Title VII has preempted such
legislation, or compliance with the state regulation should excuse such sex
discrimination as would ordinarily be violative of Title VII.
The preemptive implication of Title VII must be determined without
substantial guidance from the legislative history. 73 Congresswoman
Griffiths, arguing in support of the sex amendment, did declare that
"[m]ost of the so-called protective legislation has really been to protect
men's rights in better paying jobs."' 74 However, her other remarks and
the statements of other Congresswomen indicate that the House as a
whole never reached a firm decision as to the wisdom and necessity of
the state protective legislation.175
Section 708 of the Act, which attempts to deal with preemption, is
similarly confusing:
Nothing in this [title] shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person
from any .. . duty . . . provided by any present or future law of any
State. . ., other than any such law which purports to require or permit
the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice
under this [title].176
Litigation as to the constitutionality of the protective legislation under Title VII
and the Fourteenth Amendment is now pending. CCH GUIDE q1 8145. A trial judge
recently convicted a defendant of violating California's law against employing female
bartenders, but urged appeal in order to raise the constitutional issues. People v.
Gardner, L.A. Munic. CL, No. 247955, February 23, 1966, CCH GumE 41 9015.
171In preemption situations legislative guidance is frequently absent. Note,
Pre-Emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN.
L. REv. 208, 210 (1959).
174 110 CONG. REc. 2580 (1964).
276 Congresswoman Griffiths stated: "I have yet to find a lawyer on this floor
who cares to state unequivocally that the State law will continue to prevail." Id.
Other statements were confusing. Though Congresswoman St. George strongly
questioned the continued validity of protective legislation, id. at 2580-81, Congress-
woman Kelly interpreted her remarks to mean that the laws would not be affected
by the amendment and stated: "I believe in equality for women, and am sure the
acceptance of the amendment will not repeal the protective laws of the several States."
Id. at 2583. Since Mrs. Kelly was also speaking about an equal pay amendment
which she did not support, it is not certain that she was referring to the preemptive
scope of the sex amendment.
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1964) (emphasis added).
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In the context of the entire Act, which seeks the elimination of discrim-
ination on the basis of race, color, religion, and national origin in addi-
tion to dealing with sex discrimination, section 708's primary purpose
seems to be to insure affirmatively the continued vitality of state fair em-
ployment practice laws.177 Furthermore, much of the protective legisla-
tion, rather than requiring or permitting the doing of discriminatory acts,
simply renders women inconvenient or expensive to employ. Even those
laws which do require the total exclusion of women from employment 78
do not necessarily violate the section's "unlawful employment practice"
prohibition, for the language is susceptible only of a circular analysis:
if Congress "intended" the state laws' preservation, then the disabilities
whichsuch legislation imposes becomes a proper basis for a BFOQ ex-
ception; and practices based thereon do not constitute unlawful employ-
ment practices.
The EEOC has been reluctant to suggest a solution to the state pro-
tective law problem. Its initial reaction was to suggest that Congress did
not intend to disturb those laws "which are intended to, and have the
effect of, protecting women against exploitation and hazard."179  The
Commission, however, recognized that some state laws might be used to
justify what would otherwise be an unlawful employment practice,18 0 and
therefore pledged itself, in cooperation with other agencies, to effect the
elimination of state laws which were irrelevant and discriminatory rather
than protective. 181 Furthermore, the EEOC has consistently demanded
that employers, before asserting the necessity of discrimination under
state law as a BFOQ basis, seek all available administrative exceptions
to the law invoked.182 Finally, although the Commission for a long while
'" See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
1
7 8 See notes 166-67 supra.
11 Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1968).
18' See, e.g., G.C. Op. Ltr., 12/20/65, Digest of EEOC Legal Interpretations,
October 1965-March 1966, § .04, CCI GUImE q 17,252; G.C. Op. Ltr., September 7,
1965, Digest of EEOC Legal Interpretations, July-October 1965, § .042, CCH GUIDE
q 17,251.
"I1 Guidelines, supra note 179, at § 1604.1(b).
182 The EEOC required a Pennsylvania employer to seek exceptions to the state
hours law when this law was invoked as justifying the refusal of an otherwise quali-
fied female's bid. EEOC Decision, CCH GUIDE q 17,304. The Pennsylvania law
is somewhat unusual in that it gives the State Secretary of Labor broad discretion to
excuse certain employees from the law's coverage. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 103-104
(Supp. 1967). Massachusetts has provided similar exemptions on a temporary
basis. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, §§ 53-105 (Supp. 1967). Administratively
approved exceptions are frequently provided for contingencies such as emergencies,
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avoided any substantive consideration of the state legislation, it has re-
cently announced that it will begin such investigation, and that it will not
recognize, as a BFOQ basis, state laws which discriminate rather than
protect.18 3
The EEOC's decision to begin distinguishing between acceptable and
unacceptable protective legislation probably stems partly from a realization
that its former abstention had been interpreted to mean that the EEOC
did not believe Title VII was to have any preemptive effect whatsoever.
In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company,184 the
only case which has dealt directly with the continued vitality of protec-
tive legislation, the court found nothing in the Act "to indicate that Con-
gress intended to nullify or limit the application of such laws. ... "185
The court further stated that EEOC guidelines "recognize the validity of
state protective legislation concerning weight-lifting for women." 18 6  The
Commission's initial reluctance has been similarly influential in several
arbitration decisions, all of which have sustained the state law.187 State
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-14-10(2) (1963) ("relaxation permit"), seasonal
peaks, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-12 (Supp. 1966), or other special condi-
tions, e.g., NJ. STAT. ANN. § 34:2-28 (Supp. 1967) (night work permitted where
adequate facilities and transportation).
"' From the middle of 1966 to early 1968, the Commission took the position
that in cases involving protective legislation it would merely advise the complainant
of his right to bring suit challenging the law. EEOC Release, Processing of Cases
Involving State Protective Laws, Aug. 19, 1966, CCH GuiDn q 16,900.001 n.2. The
stance was justified on the grounds that the Commission's limited powers could not in-
sulate the employer from liability under state law. The EEOC has now reaffirmed its
initial guideline published in 1965. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1968). Under this policy the Commission will recognize
only those laws which are designed to protect, and not those laws which discriminate
against women. CCH Gus q 16,900.001.
"1277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967).
185 Id. at 118; see Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 364
(S.D. Ind. 1967) (dictum).
; 6 277 F. Supp. at 118.
1287Alsco, Inc. v. Steelworkers Local 4612, 67-2 CCH LAB. Aim. AwARDs 4304
(1967); General Fireproofing Co. v. Steelworkers Local 1617, 67-1 CCH LAD. Ann.
AWARDs 3809 (1967); Rold Gold Foods v. Bakery Workers' Local 33, 66-3 CCH
LAB. Ann. AWARDS 6046 (1966); Schaefer Super Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
1059, 66-1 CCH LAB. Ann. AWARDS 3920 (1966); Standard Oil Co. v. Teamsters
Local 10, 65-2 CCH LAB. ARn. AWARDS 5210 (1965). All of these decisions dealt
with the Ohio law, which perhaps suggests it is too restrictive. See note 166, supra.
Recall also the limited application Title VII has to arbitration. See note 135 supra.
But see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 66-1 CCH
LAB. Am. AWARDS 4180 (1966), where the arbitrator felt that Minnesota's forty-
pound weight-lifting limit could not be invoked to deny a job to a female since (1)
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attorney general opinions supporting the laws have also relied partially
upon the EEOC's seeming approval.188
Only the Arizona Civil Rights Commission has forthrightly dissented
from the proposition that protective legislation has not been preempted.
In Reynolds v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company,189
the Arizona Commission, which is charged with enforcing that state's fair
employment practice law, held that the state law regulating the hours of
employment for women must yield to both Title VII and the state FEP
law. Reasoning that the protective legislation was an anachronism based
upon the questionable assumption that women are physically inferior to
men, the state commission declared:
rTlhe spirit of [Title VII] is clear. It was enacted to provide equal em-
ployment for all persons, including women. That opportunity is restricted
and prevented by [the state hours law]. We believe that Congress was
not unmindful of the effect of protective legislation on employment op-
portunities for women and that it was the intent of Congress that [such]
legislation... yield to Title VII.190
Though the legislative history does not provide as ready an answer as
the Reynolds case implies,191 a number of stronger arguments may be
made in support of the position that Title VII preempts state legislation.
Such a holding would quickly effect changes without the necessity of over-
coming legislative inertia. Further, Congress would be squarely chal-
lenged to respond if it in fact wished the protective laws to stand.192 Fi-
nally, any Congressional reaction would be likely to produce useful dia-
logue as to the ultimate desirability of state laws which regulate the em-
ployment of one sex only.
Other considerations, however, mitigate against judicial invalidation
of state law on preemption grounds. In the first place, the judiciary is
not well equipped to ascertain the necessity of such legislation as com-
pared to a legislative body, which is in a position to make decisions based
whether heavy lifting would be required was "largely a matter of conjecture," and
(2) the company had sanctioned "more or less regular lifting of heavy weights (up
to 90 pounds) by certain other female employees... Id. at 4182.
"I E.g., MD. ATr'Y GEN. Op. (January 19, 1966), CCH GuDE (1 8044; Mo.
ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. 45 (1967), CCH GumE q 8136.
118 Op. & Ord., Arizona Civil Rights Comm'n, Case No. 17-12 E (December 2,
1966), CCH GumIE q 8111.
20 Id. at 6185 (emphasis added).
I'l See notes 173-75 supra and accompanying text.
"'
1 See Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construc-
tion, 12 STAN. L. Rnv. 208, 225 (1959).
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upon scientific and historical research, and upon informative hearings.
But the primary practical reason for the exercise of judicial restraint is
that the states themselves have begun to reform their protective laws.
Since Title VII's passage, two states, Delaware and Michigan, have re-
pealed virtually all of their protective legislation. 193 Several other states,
rather than simply removing the protection, have extended their min-
imum wage benefits to men.194 North Dakota has more generally ex-
tended its laws regulating labor standards, 9 5 and Pennsylvania, 196 and
apparently Indiana,197 have repealed former prohibitions against women
bartenders. Even Ohio has shown signs of relaxing its strict standards
by recently deleting its prohibition against using women as operators of
buffing and grinding machinery. 198 South Carolina no longer restricts
women from performing night work,199 and numerous other states have
relaxed their hour laws through ameliorative exceptions.20°
In view of the rapid changes being effected by the state legislatures,
it would seem a wise policy for both the EEOC and the courts to
continue recognizing state law as a BFOQ basis. The only alter-
natives to such a course are to investigate each law on an individual
basis-a task which the courts are not well equipped to do, or to hold
that all such legislation is preempted. Thus, it is suggested that where
no administrative exceptions are available and compliance with the state
law would make the equal employment of women an unreasonable burden,
sex should be considered a BFOQ.
Practical Application of Title VII's Proscription
In addition to ascertaining the abstract meaning of discrimination and
the content of the BFOQ exception, there is also the related problem of
193Ch. 218, 55 Del. Laws [1965]; nos. 187, 195, 282, Mich. Acts [1967].
1 9' KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 337.210-.360 (Supp. 1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 279:2 -:11 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 197.1 -.15 (Supp. 1967).
"'
9N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 34-0&02, -03, -05 (Supp. 1967).
196 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493(25) (Supp. 1967).
t't IND. ANM. STAT. § 12-530 (Supp. 1967).
198 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 4107.23 (N) (Page Supp. 1967). This type of law
almost certainly was passed in response to craft unions which desired self-protection.
See WOMEN'S BuREAu, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 66, HISTORY OF LABOR
LEGiSLATION FOR WOMEN IN THeE STATES 2, 62-64, 109-11, 114-16 (1929).
1o0 S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-81 (Supp. 1967).
"'E.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. § 23-281(B)(7) (Supp. 1967); CAL. LABOR CODE §
1352 (Supp. 1967); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-14-10 (Supp. 1967); MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 149, §§ 56, 59 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 290.040 (Supp. 1967);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-17 (Supp. 1967); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.28.070 (Supp. 1967).
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determining how these concepts may be applied in actual employment
situations. The actual impact of the discrimination prohibition, for ex-
ample, will be affected by whether the courts permit employees in differ-
ent job categories to be compared. Similarly, the breadth afforded the
BFOQ exception will depend partly upon whether it may be used to
justify benefit, as well as hiring, differentials. /
(1) Discrimination
An outright refusal to hire or retain an individual, to refer him for
employment, or to admit him to union membership 01 because of the in-
dividual's sex constitutes the most obvious form of employment discrimi-
nation, a stark violation of the very language of Title VII. Equally
blatant would be a refusal to compensate him equally because of his sex.
Furthermore, discriminatory "hiring" is manifested during the employ-
ment relation, insofar as the employee's rights to bidding, promotion,
bumping, or recall are limited on the basis of sex, or insofar as his
freedom from layoff is restricted on that basis.202 In addition, Title VII
specifically prohibits employment advertising which indicates "any pref-
erence, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on . . . sex"
101 It is curious that the BFOQ exception for labor organizations is not coexten-
sive with the initially proscribed activities. In section 703(c) (1) labor organizations
are forbidden "to exclude . . .from [their] membership ...any individual because
of his ... sex ... 2' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1) (1964) (emphasis added) (see note
94 supra). On the other hand, the BFOQ exception merely permits labor organiza-
tions "to classify" their membership and refer for employment on the basis of sex
where sex is a BFOQ. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1964) (emphasis added) (see
note 120 supra). If a union deals solely with an employer who, because of a BFOQ,
is justified in refusing to hire women, one wonders if the union would be justified in
excluding women from membership altogether. Perhaps the BFOQ exception was
drafted under the assumption that all unions would represent bargaining units in
which some jobs were open to women. If the drafters did make this assumption, then
this provision seems to indicate that they felt the BFOQ was to be very narrowly
interpreted. For example, if a union which represents only miners may not exclude
women from membership, then this would seem to imply that sex is not a BFOQ for
the job of miner-even in the presence of state protective legislation.
The other BFOQ provisions are coextensive with the general proscription of the
Act. Employers are forbidden to engage in specifically enumerated activities by sec-
tion 703(a), but the BFOQ exception permits them "to hire and employ" on the
basis of sex where sex is a BFOQ. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1) (1964) (see note 120
supra). The words "and employ" seem an implicit recognition of the fact that hiring
differentials are inextricably linked to differentials in other terms and conditions of
employment. The word "employ" connotes more than the initial act of engaging a
person's services. The various bases on which one continues to work-the terms and
conditions of employment-are included in the term.
"' Where the free play of the seniority system is limited because certain jobs
are closed to members of one sex, then it would seem that the employer is guilty of
Vol. 1968: 671"]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
unless sex is a BFOQ.20 3 Correspondingly, the EEOC has stated that
pre-employment inquiries are subject to the same limitations.2°4
Discriminatory employment practices, however, may be effected by
more subtle means than a flat refusal to hire, employ, refer, or admit
members of one sex. Discrimination takes place when members of one
sex are denied employment for reasons which are not used to deny em-
ployment to members of the opposite sex. Typical examples of such
differentials include the refusal to hire or employ women who are mar-
"refusing to hire." The label used, however, is not important, since employers - are
also forbidden to discriminate with respect to terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964). Furthermore, employers are for-
bidden to "limit" employees in any way which would deprive them of employment
opportunities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1964). See note 118 supra.
Surplus labor will normally be laid off on the basis of seniority. When alterna-
tive jobs are open, senior employees are frequently given the right to "bid" for them,
and, as jobs open up after layoff, senior employees are generally recalled first. Bump-
ing situations may likewise give rise to discrimination. "Bumping" is a common type
of job displacement whereby an employee laid off on the basis of his departmental
seniority may displace-"bump"-an employee in another department who is his
junior on the basis of plant wide seniority. If some or all of the junior positions
available happen to be restricted as to sex, then members of the disadvantaged sex
are limited in their opportunity to bump.
A system utilizing most of these features and restricting jobs on the basis of
sex is found in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
See note 160 supra and following text.
...42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1964). The EEOC's original interpretation was
that advertisements could not be published in columns classified by publishers under
"male" or "female" headings unless (1) the advertisement specifically stated it was
open to both men and women, and (2) there was a notice on every other page of the
classified section stating that jobs under such headings were open to both sexes.
EEOC Digest of Lgeal Interpretations, October 1965-March 1966, § .03, CCH GUIDE
q 17,252.
Widespread non-compliance resulted in a change of policy. Now employment
advertising may be placed in columns under the headings "male" and "female," on
the theory that such headings merely direct the reader to those jobs which are nor-
mally of greater interest to members of one sex. The Commission will consider only
the advertisement itself, which, of course, may not specify a sex limitation unless sex
is a BFOQ. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4
(1968).
I0" Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.6 (1968).
This regulation would seem to be consistent with the Act's prohibition of publishing
any notice relating to employment which specifies a sex limitation. "Publish" would
not seem to be limited to that which is manifested in writing. Nor need "notice"
come in the form of direct statement; it may be conveyed by a sex based rhetorical
question. The EEOC of course feels that inquiry as to sex is permissible if made for
a non-discriminatory purpose, such as the record keeping required by the Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) 1964).
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tied,205 women who are under a certain age,206 or women who have chil-
dren,207 while accepting men with those same characteristics. Further-
more, the possibility that employment differentials are unlawfully based
upon sex is not necessarily eliminated merely because the employees being
compared occupy different job categories. The outlines of this possibility
appear in section 703(h) of the Act, which sanctions different treatment
of employees of the opposite sex when such differentiation is made
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees
who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate....208
The language of section 703(h) would seem susceptible of two inter-
pretations. On the one hand, it might be read to justify differentials be-
tween men and women where (1) they rank differently in seniority, per-
form different tasks, or work in different locations, and (2) the job struc-
ture itself has not been established for the purpose of discrimination. If
these conditions are found to exist, the holding should be "no discrimina-
tion," and therefore, no need to determine further whether the difference
constitutes a BFOQ. This broad interpretation of 703(h) was apparently
accepted in the recent case of Cooper v. Delta Air Lines, Incorporated,20 9
which held that it was not discriminatory to require that stewardesses
resign upon marriage, even though no similar restriction was imposed
upon male employees. Noting that Delta did not employ males as flight
cabin attendants, the court stated "[tihe discrimination lies in the fact that
the plaintiff is married-and the law does not prevent discrimination
against married people in favor of the single ones. 210 The court thus
refused to compare the treatment of employees in different job categories,
assuming that since there are no male flight cabin attendants, any differ-
ential between male and female crew members211 is per se legitimate.
20r Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (a) (1968);
EEOC Digest of Legal Interpretations, July 1965-October 1965, § .043, CCH GuIDE
g1 17,251.208 G.C. Op. Ltr. Nov. 22, 1966, CCH GUmE, (1 17,304.52.
'07 EEOC Digest of Legal Interpretations, July 1965-October 1965, § .043, CCH
GUIDE q 17,251.
208 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964) (emphasis added).
20' 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967).
-
10 Id. at 783.
2. Flight cabin attendant is, after all, merely a subdivision of the larger job
category of crew member. The contention made here is that job categorization
should not automatically stop any inquiry into employment differentials between the
sexes.
Vol. 1968: 671]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
A better interpretation of section 703(h) seems to be that hiring or
benefit differentials are permissible only when they are in fact based upon
seniority, production, or location, rather than upon sex. Under this view,
the question of discrimination would first be answered by comparison of
employment qualifications in different job categories. If a sex-based dif-
ferential between employees in different jobs is discovered, then the em-
ployer should bear the burden of showing that the BFOQ exception some-
how justifies the differential. One way he might do so is by proving the
actual existence of one of the factors listed in section 703 (h). Thus, in
Cooper, Delta might have been able to show that the marriage differential
between pilots and stewardesses was either not based upon sex or was justi-
fied as a BFOQ, and the court should have heard evidence on the ques-
tion. 21z
While multi-category comparisons may be made in determining the
discriminatory nature of other conditions of employment, such compari-
son is probably impermissible in ascertaining the existence of wage or
compensation discrimination. Because of an amendment by Senator
Bennett, Title VII provides that wage differences between the sexes are not
unlawful "if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section
6(d) of Title 29 (the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended)."2 13
The wage differentials which are most likely to be considered "authorized"
by section 6(d) of the FLSA, which is generally known as the Equal Pay
Act of 1963,214 are those made pursuant to one of the four exceptions
"I2 Proof that Delta did not terminate the employment of other types of female
help, such as secretaries or women pilots, would be evidential of the fact that the
no-marriage rule is not based upon sex, but it would not be conclusive. Hiring mar-
ried women as secretaries would only tend to show that the airline feels that crew
members have unique obligations to be punctual or to be flexible for schedule
changes--obligations not imposed upon office workers. That the airline may employ
a few married women as pilots would only tend to prove that women who wish to
acquire employment as married crew members must be very unusual in order to over-
come assumptions normally made about them because of their sex.
2' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
-
1 The Equal Pay Act of 1963, amending section 6, provides in pertinent part:
"No employer having employees subject to [the minimum wage coverage of the Fair
Labor Standards Act] shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such
employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to
employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages
to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working condiitons, except where such payment is made
pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which meas-
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listed at the end of that Act: seniority, merit, production, or considera-
tions other than sex. The presence of these same exceptions at the begin-
ning of section 703(h) 215 has led one commentator to conclude that in
order to give both parts of the statute meaning, the Bennett amendment
"must be interpreted to mean that discrimination in compensation on
account of sex does not violate Title VII unless it also violates the Equal
Pay Act."216  Such an interpretation would mean that an employee who
is protected from sex discrimination with respect to all other aspects of
the employment relation would not be protected with respect to his
wages unless he was subject to the limited FLSA coverage.217 Despite
the fact that Senators Bennett and Dirksen, the two original supporters of
the hastily-adopted Bennett amendment, 213 have subsequently stated that
this anomalous interpretation of Title VII coincides exactly with their
original understanding, 219 Senator Clark has disputed this reading, strongly
criticizing the use of "ex post facto legislative history." 220
ures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on
any other factor other than sex... " 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1964).
s See note 208 supra and accompanying text.
Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62, 76 (1964). But see id. at 76 n.26.
21
.As an amendment to section 6 of the FLSA, the Equal Pay Act coverage ex-
tends only to employees "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce" or to employees who are "employed in an enterprise engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce." The extent of such coverage,
explained in Wage-Hour Administrator Interpretations, 29 C.F.R. §§ 800.5-.15
(1968), is more narrow than Title VII coverage which affects employees of "em-
ployers" who hire 25 or more employees and are "engaged in an industry affecting
commerce." See Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520-23 (1942). Further-
more, the Equal Pay Act is also subject to numerous section 13 (a) exemptions un-
der the FLSA. See also notes 28-30 supra and accompanying text.
218 110 CONG. REc. 13647 (1964).
-19 Nearly one year after Title VII's enactment, and after having read the Berg
article, cited supra note 216, Senator Bennett placed a brief in the Congressional
Record, explaining "it is not an unlawful employment practice . . . to differentiate
on the basis of sex in determining the compewation of 'white collar workers and
other employees who are exempt under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act." 111 CoNG. Ruc. 12884 (1965). Dirksen's statement at the time of the
amendments passage conformed to this anomalous interpretation: 'The Fair Labor
Standards Act carries out certain exceptions. All that the pending amendment does
is recognize those exceptions, that are carried in the basic Act." 110 CoNG. REc.
13647 (1964).
20 111 CONG. REc. 17644, 17646 (1965). For Senator Clark's understanding of
the Equal 'Pay Act/Title VII relationship before Bennett offered -his amendment see
110 CONG. Rac. 7217 (1964).
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Though the Bennett-Dirksen interpretation is a possible reading, it
does not appear that such an interpretation is necessary in order to give
meaning to the Bennett amendment. The Equal Pay Act provides on its
face that wage differentials are unlawful when members of one sex are
paid at a rate less than members of the opposite sex within the same estab-
lishment "for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions ..... 221 Though job content rather than job title
will determine whether such job equality exists, 222 it is clear that the wages
of workers doing very different work223 or working in different establish-
ments224 will not be compared under the Equal Pay Act in determining
first-stage discrimination. Similar standards should be applied under
Title VII2 5 to all employers, unions, and employment agencies covered
by Title VII, and not just to those persons encompassed within the Equal
Pay Act's terms. Not only does such an interpretation provide a comfort-
able reading of the Act; it would also appear to provide a very reasonable
standard of comparison. Where job content is different, wages are al-
most certain to be different. Other job benefit differentials, however,
such as smoking or marriage privileges, are more likely to be based upon
sex.
2
221 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1) (1964) (emphasis added) (see note 214 supra).
-
2 See Wirtz v. Basic Inc., 256 F. Supp. 786, 790 (D. Nev. 1966). See also
1967 U. ILL. L.F. 202, 203-05 (criticizing the decision on grounds substantially dif-
ferent working conditions were present).
' ' The concept of equal work is analyzed by the Wage-Hour Administrator at
29 C.F.R. §§ 800.119 -.132 (1968).
" Although employees at one establishment need not be within the same "physi-
cal plant," the Administrator contends that the legislative history makes it clear that
employees at different establishments are not to be compared. See 29 C.F.R. §§
800.103 -.104 (1968).
22The proposed interpretation has been suggested by other commentators.
Murray & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrinlination and Title VII, 34
GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 232, 255-56 (1965). Furthermore, it iA in line with the EEOC's
interpretation. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7
(1968).
"8 Should the courts adopt the proposed interpretation, they will face the diffi-
cult problem of distinguishing between "wages or compensation" and other terms,
conditions and privileges of employment. The Wage-Hour Administrator has pro-
vided rather detailed guidelines as to the meaning of "wages" under the Equal Pay
Act, and they will probably be followed under Title VII interpretation. Generally,
wages are payments made to or on behalf of employees as remuneration for employ-
ment, including holiday, vacation and premium pay. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§
800.110, .112-.116 (1968).
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(2) The BFOQ Exception
Once having determined that a discriminatory differential exists, courts
must then ascertain whether such a differential may be sanctioned by the
BFOQ exception. Because the phrase "bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation" connotes threshold competency, capacity, or initial suitability,
there exists a temptation to assume that the BFOQ only justifies dis-
crimination which limits a person's ability to acquire a job, and not bene-
fit differentials once the job itself has been acquired. Such an analysis
is somewhat misleading, however, since it fails to recognize the intimate
relationship between job benefits and job qualifications. Insofar as the
maintenance of a job qualification is a prerequisite to job retention, the
qualification simultaneously limits a privilege of employment and creates
a condition of that employment. For example, where an applicant must
be a non-smoker in order to qualify for a particular job, the qualification
thereafter restricts what would ordinarily be a privilege of employment
(the right to smoke). The ability to meet the qualification depends upon
what the worker is (a non-smoker) as well as upon what the worker is
willing to be (a continued non-smoker). Indeed, the most obvious form
of job benefit-wages-is basically a function of an initial "qualifica-
tion": the quality of being willing to work for a given wage. Because
the terms and conditions of employment are inextricably linked to those
qualifications which the employer initially demands of his employees, the
BFOQ exception must necessarily be available to justify benefit differen-
tials as well as qualification differences.
When an employer is employing men and women to perform the same
tasks, however, it seems difficult conceptually to maintain that sex is a
bona fide occupational qualification which somehow justifies an employ-
ment differential, such as a requirement that women-but not men-
be non-smokers, or be willing to accept a lower wage. Indeed, the
EEOC's position is quite rigid: the BFOQ can never justify sex benefit
differentials in such things as insurance benefits,2 7 advancement oppor-
"2 Insurance benefits (life, health, medical or accident) must not be less com-
prehensive for women than for men, solely on the basis of sex. EEOC Release, June
29, 1966, CCH Gur- 41 17,303; EEOC Digest of Legal Interpretations, July 1965-
October 1965, § .044, CCH GurmE q1 17,251. Lower benefits for employees who are
not the "principal wage earner" in their family, however, are legitimate. G.C. Op.
Ltr. Aug. 25, 1966, CCH GuiDE q 17,304.31; EEOC Release, June 29, 1966, CCH
GUIDE q 17,303. Furthermore, an employer may reject an application based on the
insurability of the employee's spouse where "reasonable standards" are used. EEOC
Release, June 29, 1966, CCH GUIDE q1 17,303. If the program is arranged with the
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tunities,2= profit sharing plans,229 and guaranteed work weeks.230  Further-
more, the Commission refuses to permit different hiring standards for the
same job to be applied to the sexes.231 It is unclear whether the Commis-
sion's position results from its conviction that significant differences be-
tween the sexes simply do not exist, or whether it stems from the feeling
that the BFOQ exception can only justify total exclusion from employ-
ment, rather than benefit/hiring differentials once the initial decision to
hire both sexes has been made. If the Commission's position takes root
in a conviction that the BFOQ cannot analytically justify such benefit/
hiring differentials, then it would seem to be in error. Where an employer
refuses to hire or employ married women but willingly accepts married
men, it admittedly appears difficult to justify the differential under the
BFOQ language. Sex does not seem to be a BFOQ since the employer
is perfectly willing to employ single women. This conceptual difficulty
may be overcome, however, by recognizing that the employer actually
maintains two job categories: unmarried workers and married workers.
The employer may justify his no-marriage-for-women rule by proving
that sex is a BFOQ for the position of married worker. Just as he would
prove that sex is a BFOQ for a job requiring great physical strength, an
employer seeking to justify the marriage restriction would argue that a
a characteristic common to women, such as high absenteeism following
marriage, is incompatible with profit-producing job performance, and
that avoidance of the cost of discovering the unusual woman who would
remain dependable following marriage is reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of his business.232
(3) Pregnancy
One area of employment differentiation in which there has been a
notable lack of any attempt to analyze either the meaning of discrimina-
employer's consent, then these standards apply even if the employer makes no con-
tributions. G.C. Op. Ltr. Aug. 24, 1966, CCH GumnE q 17,304.29.
228 EEOC Digest of Legal Interpretations, October 1965-March 1966, § .04,
CCH GumE q1 17,252.
220G .C. Op. Ltr. Oct. 21, 1966, CCH GuImE q 17,304.47.
230 G.C. Op. Ltr. July 29, 1966, CCIH Gum q1 17,304.09.
231 Different hiring standards are applied when women are refused employment
for reasons, such as marital status, which are not used to restrict male employment.
See text following note 204 supra.
22 The presentation of this hypothetical example is not meant to imply that the
employer could necessarily carry the burden of actually proving that sex is a BFOQ
in either case. See notes 123, 154 & 161 supra and accompanying text. Rather, the
example is used only to illustrate that, conceptually, the BFOQ exception may justify
employment benefit differentials as well as absolute -hiring exclusions.
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tion or the possibility of BFOQ justification is that of maternity benefits.
The EEOC has stated that "since maternity is a temporary disability
unique to the female sex and more or less to be anticipated during the
working life of most employees," absences due to pregnancy must be
accorded "special recognition" in order to provide "substantial equality
of economic opportunity for both sexes .... -233 The Commission rec-
ommmends that this special recognition should normally take the form of
a leave of absence, except where such a leave would unduly burden the
employer. Where a leave is impractical because of the difficulty of hold-
ing the job open or of filling it on a temporary basis, then the Commission
feels that the employee should be reassigned to similar work upon return
or at least given preferential consideration in future hiring.234 Although
maternity leaves are to be granted regardless of whether leaves are granted
for ordinary sickness or injury, the employer is not obligated to provide
the same benefits for a woman on maternity leave that he would for an
employee on sick leave.235 Further, the Commission approves compul-
sory leaves of absence for pregnancy only when the leave begins after a
reasonable duration of pregnancy.236
Though the conclusions reached by the Commission seem satisfactory,
its "equitable" approach to the problem has frequently failed to find ra-
tionalization within the terms of the Act.23 7 The resulting confusion has
led one commentator to suggest that requiring an employer to provide
maternity leave is analogous to requiring that a male employee be granted
"a leave of absence in order to effectuate an adoption." 238  The analogy
seems unsound, however, since women, to be treated without discrimina-
"' G.C. Op. Ltr. Aug. 17, 1966, OCH GuiDE q 17,304.19.
Id.; G.C. Op. Ltr. Aug. 18, 1966, CCH GumE q 17,304.22; G.C. Op. Ltr.
Feb. 17, 1967, CCH GumE 41 17,304.58.
"I G.C. Op. Ltr. Nov. 15, 1966, CCH GuEDE q 17,304.51; G.C. Op. Ltr. Nov.
10, 1966, CCH, GuiDE q 17,304.49; G.C. Op. Ltr. Oct. 17, 1966, CCH GumE q1
17,304.43; G.C. Op. Ltr. Aug. 17, 1966, CCH GUIDE q1 17,304.19. However, the
employer may deny maternity leave if there has been an insufficient length of service.
G.C. Op. Ltr. Feb. 20, 1967, CCII GUIDE qJ 17,304.59 (one year limit reasonable).
=0 G.C. Op. Ltr. Feb. 20, 1967, CCH GuiDE q 17,304.59 (end of fourth month
is unreasonable); G.C. Ltr. Aug. 17, 1966, CCH GUIDE q1 17,304.20 (end of
sixth month is reasonable).
217 "[O]ur approach to the problems in this area has been to seek an equitable
balance between the needs of the employer and employee . . . ." G.C. Op. Ltr.
Feb. 20, 1967, CCH GumE q 17,304.59, at 7413-34.
I's8 Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 DENVER LJ. 334,
361 (1967).
Vol. 1968: 671]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
tion, must be permitted to be women.239 Because the maternal function
is so basic to the female biological-cultural role, penalizing the fulfilling
of that role seems an undeniable discrimination, at least where men are
not similarly required to surrender part of their basic cultural role. The
extent to which restrictions may lawfully be placed upon the right to be
a mother would seem to depend upon the application of the BFOQ ex-
ception.
Where a woman who is capable of performing her job is discharged
or compelled to take a leave of absence because she is pregnant, sex dis-
crimination has occurred; she has been eliminated on the basis of a physical
condition peculiar to her sex. The situation is analytically no different
than where a capable man is eliminated because of a condition peculiar
to men, such as spermatorrhea or red-green color blindness.240 However,
since the discrimination consists in elimination on the basis of a condition
unique to one sex, the application of the BFOQ exception takes unusual
form. Rather than proving that being a man is BFOQ for the job, the
employer proves that the absence of the unique sexual condition (e.g.,
"x" months pregnant) is a BFOQ. This could be done by showing that
women who are "x months pregnant are generally less productive work-
ers, and that, because of the expense of discovering unusual individuals,
it is reasonably necessary to base employment practices on such a general-
ization. The Commission's standards seem to provide the types of limita-
tions which may be placed upon the pregnant female under the "reason-
ably necessary" criteria of the BFOQ exception.
CONCLUSION
Title VIi's sex discrimination proscription, though involving myriad
lesser problems, primarily necessitates inquiry into two areas: (1) the
meaning of sex discrimination, and (2) the substance of the BFOQ
justification. While an overly broad definition of discrimination will result
in preferential treatment for one sex, or "reverse discrimination," recogni-
tion still must be afforded the fact that discrimination exists insofar as
employment standards exclusively favor or penalize one sex.
Though not wholly the source of the logical inconsistencies of the
inquiry into the meaning of discrimination, investigation of the BFOQ
exception adds difficult policy and factual determinations. In balancing
219 See notes 110-13 supra and accompanying text.
210 See note 98 supra.
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the many considerations, either of two basic approaches might be followed.
On the one hand, it might be assumed that the Act's purpose was merely
to insure that henceforth sex discrimination in employment would be
rational and reasonable. Such an interpretation, however, supposes that
Congress, lacking confidence in the free play of the market, desired only
to deal with irrational and purposeless discrimination, and that the pri-
mary objective of the ban was to proscribe employment practices based
upon the irrational prejudices of employers. The alternative to this sweep-
ing interpretation of the BFOQ exception is the reading suggested by this
comment: Congress, in an attempt to provide greater female employment
opportunity outlawed certain forms of profitable, and hence reasonable,
sex discrimination. Certainly, the Act's prohibition of racial discrimina-
tion contemplates the temporary reduction of profits in the interest of
eliminating the discriminatory evil. It would seem that the elimination of
sex discrimination should likewise become a cost of business. Under this
view, the BFOQ should only be applied to sustain sex-based job qualifica-
tions which are probably impossible to eradicate or whose removal would
impose too great a financial burden on the employer. Only through such
a restrictive interpretation of the BFOQ can the ultimate congressional
goal of equal employment opportunity be realized.
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